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Abstract 
 
This thesis aims to develop a set of strategic tools for real estate development projects. The conventional 
tools such as the Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) method fail to incorporate dynamics of real estate 
development processes. As a result, their application to real world situation is quite limited. Two methods 
are introduced to deal with this inadequacy of the DCF method. Decision Tree Analysis (DTA) employs a 
management science approach to analyze flexibilities and corresponding strategies from management 
decision making perspective. Real Options Analysis (ROA) aims to apply theories of valuing financial 
derivatives to real assets and it allows investors to quantitatively analyze flexibilities. Each technique has 
advantages and shortcomings and should only be used for appropriate situations. DTA is suited for 
analyses of project specific risks that are not directly related to the overall market. ROA is a superior tool 
when risks are originated from the uncertainties of markets. Applying both tools in practice requires 
rather simplified assumptions, and it is crucial to understand them to make the analyses meaningful. 
 
The thesis finds that incorporating flexibilities in decision making into an analysis is especially important 
for large-scale and multi-phase projects. The DCF method treats the later phase projects as if they are 
fully committed at the present time. This assumption of full commitment is rarely the case in the real 
world practice, and as a result, the DCF method systematically undervalues future phases in multi-phase 
projects. The case study of New Songdo City reveals that the value of flexibility is a critical factor for the 
analyses of large scale projects, especially when there is a lot of market uncertainties involved. Based on 
the conventional DCF method, New Songdo City has a hugely negative NPV and should not be pursued. 
However, the ROA and the DTA approaches show that it has a potential for creating enormous value by 
incorporating flexibilities of the project.  
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Ch. 1. Introduction 
 
 
 
 
We do ten-year pro-forma cash flow analysis but we don’t really believe in them. 
Who knows what’s going to happen down on the road?1 
 
Nobody really uses IRR or NPV within the development industry. It’s just for 
institutional equity investors … [Therefore,] non-institutional investors are 
preferable for us. They are mostly interested in cash on cash returns.2 
 
Three methods mentioned above – Discounted Cash Flow (DCF), Net Present Value (NPV) and 
Internal Rate of Return (IRR) – have been widely accepted tools for any investment analysis. Yet, 
a number of anecdotal evidences suggest that real estate developers find these tools insufficient 
for the analyses of their development projects. The entrepreneurial nature of the development 
industry might have contributed to this lack of rigorous analyses: So called developers’ gut-
feelings sometimes become more important factors to the decision making process. However, it 
has been proven that DCF, NPV and IRR with a hurdle rate are fundamentally sound tools, and 
even within the real estate industry, these are standard methods for valuing income-generating 
institutional properties. In this sense, the relatively limited use of DCF based analyses in the 
development industry does not seem to be entirely due to developers’ naïveté. The true reason for 
their limited use might be their failure to capture a part of everyday reality involved with typical 
development projects. 
 
I believe that the inadequacy of conventional DCF, NPV and IRR for a development project 
analysis originates from their very static nature of underlying assumptions. On the contrary, the 
                                                 
1 From the presentation by the CEO of a leading New York development firm at MIT. 
2 From the class discussion with a guest speaker for the Design for Urban Development course at MIT. 
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essence of most development projects is their dynamic processes. Conventional methods give a 
single point estimates based on all the information available, and thus, it inherently implies that 
all the investment decisions are made as of now (time 0). Since most investment decisions for 
development projects are made in sequence over some time period, the conventional methods fail 
to incorporate flexibility of future decisions. This flexibility is all the more critical for large-scale 
urban mixed-use projects with multiple stages over time, and a static DCF based analysis would 
grossly misrepresent merits of such large scale projects. 
 
The goal of the thesis is to evaluate and apply methods for incorporating flexibility into the 
analysis of large-scale real estate development projects. The first half of the thesis attempts to 
layout theoretical framework for evaluating complex development projects, first using NPV 
approach and later extending NPV analysis with Decision Tree Analysis and Real Options. The 
second half of the thesis is a case study applying the methods developed in the earlier chapter to 
the “New Songdo City (NSC)” project in Incheon, Korea. The NSC project is a highly complex 
new city development project that involves 100,000,000 square feet of building space and 12 year 
project schedule with 6 different phases. The rather simplified application of Decision Tree and 
Real Options analysis demonstrate the reason why the concept of flexibility and option is critical 
for such a large scale project with a high level of uncertainties, and at the same time, reveals some 
difficulties in applying options model to real world practices.  
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Ch. 2. Literature Review 
 
 
 
 
The thesis deals with two methodologies – Decision Tree Analysis and Real Options Analysis – 
as tools for valuing flexibilities inherent in large-scale real estate development projects. Real 
estate development projects, unlike buy-sell decisions made for investing in pre-existing assets, 
require series of decision making over time, and for each future decision there are numbers of 
alternatives available. Therefore, it is important to identify what alternative courses are available 
and to plan ahead the best course of action given the flexibility. Decision Tree Analysis is a 
useful tool for laying out alternative courses of actions and their corresponding future payoffs. 
The use of Decision Tree was first advocated by J. Margee (1964) as a tool for corporate capital 
planning. Brealey and Myers (2003) introduced Decision Tree to illustrate how managerial 
flexibilities can create value for a capital project. They went one step further to propose a 
valuation technique under the Decision Tree structure. At the same time, they identified 
difficulties of determining a proper discount rate and probabilities. De Neufville (1990) proposed 
to use Decision Tree for finding optimal strategies for complex engineering projects. The 
application of Decision Tree Analysis to real estate projects has been limited, and there has been 
little research done for this purpose. However, the method is very relevant for real estate projects 
as demonstrated in the chapter 4, and it is safe to assume that it has been implicitly used for real 
estate decision makings. 
 
Real Options, on the other hand, has been studied frequently and rigorously by academics, and 
there have been a number of researches done for its application to the real estate industry. 
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Recently, many academics and practitioners attempted to apply options valuation techniques to 
real world projects and investments. Arman and Kulatilaka (1999); Copeland and Antikarov 
(2001); and Mun (2002) promoted the use of the binomial tree approach in conjunction with 
Decision Tree to identify and value Real Options on real world projects in a practical manner. 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) followed more theoretical approach by developing a series of 
mathematical models for the purpose of applying them in the real world. 
 
Real Options Analysis is useful for the analysis of real estate projects due to the fact that various 
options are embedded in them. Titman (1985) first identified a vacant land as an option to buy a 
stabilized property at an exercise price equal to its construction costs. Through the application of 
the options theory, he explained the relationship between building activity and uncertainty. He 
argued that increased uncertainty led to a decrease in building activity in the current period. 
Williams (1991) constructed an options model of real estate development to analyze the optimal 
timing and the scale of a development. Capozza and Sick (1991) explained the difference in value 
between leased and fee-simple3 property with a redevelopment options model. Based on their 
model, the discounts on leased properties are larger with high conversion efficiency, low interest 
rate, high growth rate or high uncertainty.   
 
Flexibility in land use choice has been analyzed using the options valuation theory. Capozza and 
Helsley (1990) developed a land price model based on uncertain household income and land rent. 
This model predicted that the effect of uncertainty would delay the conversion of agricultural land 
to urban land; reduce expected city size; and impart an option value to agricultural land. Geltner 
et al (1996) examined the option that is present when a site for development has more than one 
allowable uses. Based on the authors’ model that values the options to choose to construct one of 
two uses, they found that this option could add as much as 40% to the land value. This option to 
                                                 
3 Fee-simple properties were considered properties with perpetual lease. 
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choose adds the most value when the cost of land is low relative to construction costs. The model 
also identifies that the conditions for optimal development of the land become more difficult to 
achieve, and furthermore, development would never occur when the two land use choices have 
equal value. Childs et al (1996) examined the options related to the mixed-use projects. They 
came up with a model that incorporates an option to mix two uses on a site and also a 
redevelopment option. Their model suggests that returns become less certain and uses less 
correlated as the option to redevelop increases in value. The model also predicts that mixed-use 
developments will be more common in markets that are more supply sensitive or when the project 
is large relative to the existing supply. 
 
There have been many attempts made to explain aggregate level real estate market behaviors with 
Real Options framework. Williams (1993) pointed out the differences between financial options 
and Real Options in real estate projects, and modeled developers’ behaviors. According to him, 
options on real estate differ from financial options in that each real asset produces goods or 
services with a finite demand elasticity; all options to develop cannot be exercised simultaneously 
due to the limited capacity of developers; and the supply of undeveloped assets is limited. Based 
on these assumptions, the model predicted that development is optimal at all values above a 
critical value. Thus, below this optimal value, no developer builds, and above the optimal value, 
all developers build at the maximum feasible rate. Grenadier (1955) studied overbuilding 
tendencies in real estate markets with an options model. He showed increase in construction time, 
cost of changing occupancy rates, or demand volatility would lead to overbuilding. Grenadier 
(1996) later went once step further to explain the overbuilding tendency by incorporating the 
game theory approach. He argued that the simultaneous exercises and development cascades 
might be resulted from the rational fear of preemption rather than irrational overbuilding. Li 
(1999) developed a model to explain land development in emerging markets where newly 
developed properties account for a substantial portion of the aggregate supply of such properties. 
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By incorporating demand elasticity, the model suggested that the value of land and developed 
properties in the emerging markets were much lower than the corresponding values in the markets 
with perfect demand elasticity. It also illustrated that the optimal intensity and the land value were 
most sensitive to market demand conditions when interest rates and construction costs were 
lowest. 
 
There also has been some empirical research conducted to find evidences of real options pricing 
in real estate and other markets. Quigg (1993) examined land transaction data in Seattle and 
compared actual transaction prices with implied residual values of land. She found out that 
market land prices showed average 6% premium of optimal development over the residual value. 
This finding demonstrated that market participants indeed value options of waiting for optimal 
development. Holland, Ott and Riddiough (1999) proposed a model to test neoclassical versus 
option-based model of investment against US commercial real estate data. They found that the 
evidence favors the option-based model over the neoclassical model with respect to total 
uncertainty and thus irreversibility and delay are important aspects to investment decision-making. 
Another interesting result from their test was that short-run supply was inelastic with respect to 
changes in asset price but highly elastic to changes in price uncertainty. They suggested, in real 
asset markets, information regarding changes in price volatility might be more useful than 
information on changes in price levels. 
 
Several empirical researches were also conducted for non-US markets. Yamaguchi et al (2000) 
applied a real options model similar to the one developed by Quigg to Tokyo real estate market 
data. They found out that the options premium for vacant land in Tokyo were average 18% over 
residual value. This was much higher than Quigg’s estimation of 6% premium of the Seattle 
market, and it might be due to the high level of speculative activities in Tokyo. Bulan, Mayer and 
Somerville (2002) used data on condominium projects in Vancouver, Canada to empirically 
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estimate the value of waiting for optimal development. Their study suggested that builders 
delayed development during times of greater uncertainty in real estate returns and when the 
exposure to market risk was higher. They also showed that competition significantly reduced the 
sensitivity of option exercise to volatility. Therefore, competitive firms were not able to capture 
the full benefits to waiting that a monopolist had. Based on their case studies on residential 
development projects, Yao and Pretorius (2004) argued that the Hong Kong government was 
undervaluing land that it provided to developers because the government used the conventional 
DCF valuation method. They suggested the Hong Kong government use the Real Options 
approach to increase revenue and alleviate its fiscal constraints. 
  
The literature on developing Real Options model for real estate markets has been increased 
dramatically in recent years. The validity of options model in real estate was also tested and 
confirmed through empirical testing by academics, which some of them are mentioned above. 
However, the focus has been given to developing mathematical and statistical models, and there 
has been little attempt made to developing a Real Options method that could be easily applied by 
average practitioners. The concepts and procedures involved with the most Real Options models 
are beyond the scope of average practitioners’ knowledge of the subject, and therefore, the 
application of Real Options Analysis to real estate development projects has been limited. The 
empirical studies, however, shows that the development industry implicitly takes advantage of the 
options inherent to development projects. Thus, It is crucial to strategically use options in real 
estate developments to become a successful developer.  In this context, this thesis aims to 
implement practical methods to incorporate flexibilities and options inherent during real estate 
development processes, using Decision Tree and Real Options Analysis.   
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Ch. 3. Discounted Cash Flow based Analyses of Real Estate 
Development Projects 
 
 
 
3.1. Fundamentals of Net Present Value and Internal Rate of Return Methods 
 
Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) methods have traditionally been a fundamental principle in 
business decisions where money is invested now for yielding future returns. The basic principle 
of any DCF analysis is that expected future returns need to be “discounted” with an appropriate 
risk adjusted discount rate. Two of the most common DCF methods are Net Present Value (NPV) 
and Internal Rate of Return (IRR) (Hammond III, 1975). 
 
The NPV analysis basically asks whether a project is worth more than its costs. Intuitively, if 
benefits of a project exceeds or is at least equal to its costs, the project is worth undertaking. The 
essence of the NPV analysis is estimating what benefits and costs are worth for investors. The 
conventional NPV analysis applies a discount rate, determined by the concept of opportunity cost 
of capital, to value costs and benefits in present terms (Brealey and Myers, 2003). For a simple 
investment that requires the initial cash investment of C0 with T year life, the NPV for the project 
can be calculated as follows: 
T
T
r
C
r
C
r
CCNPV
)1()1(1 2
21
0 +++++++= K  
Here, r is the opportunity cost of capital for the given project, which should reflect risks of future 
cash flows. Based on this framework, the following investment decision rules are applied for a 
NPV analysis (Geltner and Miller, 2001): 
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• Maximize the NPV across all mutually exclusive alternatives.4 
• Never choose an alternative that has a negative NPV. 
 
The IRR analysis is another version of applying the concept of NPV. The IRR is defined as the 
rate of return that makes the NPV of a project equal to zero. By solving the following equation, 
we can find IRR for a project that lasts T years and requires the initial investment of C0 (Brealey 
and Myers): 
0
)1()1(1 2
21
0 =+++++++= T
T
IRR
C
IRR
C
IRR
CCNPV K   
The actual calculation of IRR would involve trial and error. However, we can easily get the 
solution using IRR function in any common spreadsheet software. The IRR in itself is not as 
useful as the NPV analysis since it does not provide any information regarding the risk of the 
project. The IRR analysis only becomes useful when it is used in relation to the opportunity cost 
of capital – the required return of the project. Comparing the IRR with the required return is 
similar to the NPV analysis. That is, when the IRR is higher than the required return, the project 
would have a positive NPV. Following this method, the decision rule for the IRR analysis is 
(Geltner and Miller): 
• Maximize the difference between the project’s expected IRR and the required return. 
• Never do a project with an expected IRR less than the required return. 
 
                                                 
4 In principle, this rule should factor in all alternatives including flexibilities of delaying, abandoning, etc. 
Therefore, options value should be considered for NPV maximization (similar to the concept of eNPV that 
will be introduced in the chapter 4). However, in practice, NPV is only calculated using the static DCF 
procedure, and thus leaves out any potential value of flexibility. In this context, the thesis does not attempt 
to replace the NPV decision rule but rather aims to expand the conventional NPV procedure to incorporate 
the value of flexibility. 
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3.2. Application of DCF based analysis to Real Estate Development Projects 
 
As illustrated in the previous chapter, the key element in the development of the NPV and the 
IRR methodology is the identification of r, known as discount rate or opportunity cost of capital. 
In theory, a discount rate should be same as the rate of return of equivalent investment 
alternatives in the capital market. Fortunately, the real estate industry has a very active market, 
and it is possible for investors to estimate a real asset’s opportunity cost of capital by observing 
the market. Although the real estate market is not as efficient as the security markets due to the 
uniqueness of individual real assets and the infrequent trading, it is possible to find out the fairly 
reliable opportunity costs for a stabilized building investment. When applied to the investment 
analysis for a core stabilized asset, the NPV and the IRR have been proven effective.  
 
In contrast to existing properties, the required return for development projects is not easily 
observable from the market. This might be one reason why the NPV approach is not as popular in 
the development industry. It is reasonable to assume that development projects are much riskier 
and thus require higher return. Furthermore, development projects are unique in that they involve 
multiple distinct phases. For instance, a development process typically involves buying an 
undeveloped land, permitting, construction, lease up, and stabilization. Each phase in a 
development process has a distinct level of risk. Therefore, to be consistent with the underlying 
theory, cash flows from each phase need to be discounted with its own risk adjusted discount rate. 
 
Consider a development project for a land valued at $ 1,900,000. In addition to the land value, 
there is $ 40,000 of permitting related costs incurred at the time zero. The best use for the site is 
building an office building, and it is expected to generate an annual net operating income of $ 
1,000,000. The lease-up is estimated to take about a year and it would generate $500,000 during 
the period. The cap rate of 8% and the opportunity cost of 10% are estimated for investing a 
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similar office building that the developer proposed to build. For speculative buildings, the 
additional 1.5% of premium can be reasonably assumed based on the market analysis. The annual 
income growth is expected to be 2%. The construction is estimated to cost $ 8,000,000 over two 
years with equal amount spent in each year. Figure 3.1 illustrates the annual cash flow of this 
development project. 
 
In this example, there are two types of future expected cash flows. One is the construction cost 
cash flow and the other is the future income cash flow. As Brealey and Myers explained in their 
analysis of the Mark II investment, fixed future cash flows should be discounted with a risk free 
rate. On the other hand, the discount rate for the future incomes can be obtained from the market, 
and in this case, the lease-up phase discount rate of 11.5% can be used. Based on this information, 
the following NPV principle can be used for the development project: 
)()()( 00 CostsPVBenefitsPVtDevelopmenNPV −=   
Assuming the building would be stabilized in the year 4, we can calculate the value of the 
building as of the year 3 with the stabilized discount rate of 10% and the long-term growth rate of 
2%: 
000,500,12
02.01.0
000,000,1)(3 =−=−OfficeStablizedPV  
 Using the lease-up discount rate of 11.5%, the present value of benefits is calculated: 
000,378,9
115.1
000,500,12
115.1
000,500)( 330 =+=BenefitsPV  
The present value of costs can be calculated in the same manner using the discount rate of 5% and 
the land cost at the time zero: 
000,378,9
05.1
000,450
05.1
000,450000,011,1)( 20 =++=CostsPV  
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Since the benefits and the costs are equal, the NPV of this development project is zero. Unless 
there are other opportunities with a positive NPV, the project is worth undertaking based on the 
NPV decision rule. 
 
The method presented above is a theoretically sound from the NPV perspective. However, it 
displays several disadvantages. The IRR of the project is 16.8% based on the cash flow projection 
in the figure 3.1. The IRR supposedly reflect higher risk of speculative development projects and 
indicates the risk premium of 6.8% over the required return of 10% for the stabilized buildings. 
However, it is hard to value the 6.8% premium because it is a blended rate of two distinct phases 
of construction, lease-up and stabilized operation. Therefore, in practice, it can be more helpful to 
identify the development period return in isolation. Geltner (2002) proposed a method to calculate 
the development required return based on the equilibrium across the markets related to the 
development industry. Since we already can reasonably estimate risks of stabilized assets and 
construction debts, we can calculate risks of development based on the other assets. That is, a 
development investment is equivalent to having a long position in the stabilized property and a 
short position in the construction costs at the same time. Assuming markets are efficient, this long 
Figure 3.1: Simplified Development Project NPV and IRR Analysis 
 
Cap rate (y) 8.0%
Growth rate (g) 2.0%
Spec Premium 1.5%
Riskfree rate 5.0%
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Rental Income 0 0 0 500,000 1,000,000
Stabilized Property Value 0 0 0 12,500,000
Construction Cost 0 4,500,000 4,500,000
Land Cost + Fee 1,011,000
Project Cash Flow (1,011,000) (4,500,000) (4,500,000) 13,000,000
PV of Benefit $9,378,000
PV of Cost $8,367,000
Residual Value $1,011,000
Market Land Price + Fee $1,011,000
NPV $0
IRR 16.8%
   
 
 - 22 -  
and short position must be equal to the development project, and thus the following relationship 
can be assumed: 
( ) ( ) ( )TD
T
T
V
T
T
C
TT
rE
L
rE
V
rE
LV
][1][1][1 +−+=+
−
 
TV  = Expected value of stabilized property at time T 
TL  = Expected balance due on construction loan at time T 
][ VrE  = Market required return on investments in a stabilized property 
][ DrE  = Market required return on construction loans 
 
Based on this relationship, we can estimate the required return for the development period: 
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Using the proposed method, the development period return of 48.5% is calculated. This method 
identifies development risk as a separate risk regime by standardizing the development as a two 
period process and it can be more easily compared with other projects. Also, the required return 
here is calculated without knowing the value of the land, and as a result, it gives information as to 
what price investors should pay for the land for a positive NPV development project. Figure 3.2 
illustrates the procedure to get the development return based on the analysis performed in Figure 
3.1. This clearly shows that the project is NPV positive when the land can be acquired for less 
than $1,011,000. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: Estimation of Two-Period Development Required Return 
 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3
Value of Stabilized Office at T=3 13,000,000
Value of Const. Cost at T=3 9,686,250
NPV at T=3 3,313,750
Residual Value at T=0 1,011,000
Two Period Cash Flow (1,011,000) 0 0 3,313,750
Devel. Period Req. Return 48.5%
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The two methods presented above provide a sophisticated analytical framework to analyze 
development projects based on NPV and DCF. However, the model’s usefulness depends on how 
effectively it can help the real world decision making process. Development projects, unlike 
typical investments in pre-existing assets or securities, involve sequential cash outflows over time. 
Accordingly, valuing the cost side of the NPV becomes as important as the benefit side. In other 
words, in addition to the risks of receiving future incomes, development projects deal with the 
risks related to the costs, such as construction cost overruns and construction delays. Therefore 
the question is whether the previously used methods reflect all the risks related to the 
development stage. From the theoretical perspective, the development stage required return 
should capture these development risks. When applied in practice, the previous models exhibit a 
high degree of sensitivity to variations in underlying assumptions.  
 
Figure 3.3 shows changes in NPV and returns when there has been 2 year delay in permitting 
with otherwise identical cash flow as in Figure 3.1.  These kinds of delays and changes are rather 
norm than exception in most development projects, and thus, it is fair to say the model’s 
usefulness depends on its ability to deal with future changes. The 2 year delay in permitting as 
illustrated in Figure 3.3 result in 2.1% decrease in the going-in IRR and 20.7% decrease in the 
development two-period return. Also, as shown in Figure 3.4, 10% decline in the expected asset 
price would result in 7% decrease in the going-in IRR and 22.7% decrease in the development 
Figure 3.3: Project NPV and IRR Analysis with 2 year permitting delay 
 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5
Rental Income 0 0 0 0 0 520,000
Stabilized Property Value 0 0 0 0 0 13,005,000
Construction Cost 0 0 0 4,682,000 4,682,000
Land Cost + Fee 1,011,000
Project Cash Flow (1,011,000) 0 0 (4,682,000) (4,682,000) 13,525,000
PV of Benefit $7,848,000
PV of Cost $8,907,000
NPV ($1,059,000)
IRR 14.7%
Development 2-Period Return 27.8%
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return. The higher degree of development projects’ sensitivity comes from the fact that they are 
levered positions on stabilized properties. That is, the upfront purchase of land brings with it the 
operating leverage, which is project exposure to fixed costs (Brealey and Myers). 
 
Figure 3.5 illustrates sensitivity of the exemple project in Figure 3.1 to the variation of the 
stabilized asset price. These example cases illustrate that, although the higher required return for 
development projects might compensate for their higher risks, the NPV and the required return 
based analyses does not help developers strategically dealing with the risks. To be sure, the NPV 
analysis is useful for avoiding bad projects and comparing with alternative projects with some 
standard measure. However, unlike investment decisions for stabilized assets, decisions regarding 
development projects are typically made over time, as cash outflow occurs over the time of the 
development. In this regard, for developers in practice, a tool to help them think ahead of future 
Figure 3.5: Sensitivity of Development Returns to Change in Asset Prices 
 
% change in Asset Price Project Level IRR Development Return (Rc) NPV
20.0% 29.6% 80.2% $1,875,000
15.0% 26.5% 73.3% $1,407,000
10.0% 23.4% 65.9% $938,000
5.0% 20.1% 57.7% $469,000
0.0% 16.8% 48.5% $0
-5.0% 13.3% 38.1% ($469,000)
-10.0% 9.8% 25.8% ($938,000)
-15.0% 6.1% 10.5% ($1,407,000)
-20.0% 2.3% -11.0% ($1,875,000)
Figure 3.4: Project NPV and IRR Analysis with 10% asset price decline 
 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4
Rental Income 0 0 0 450,000 900,000
Stabilized Property Value 0 0 0 11,250,000
Construction Cost 0 4,500,000 4,500,000
Land Cost + Fee 1,011,000
Project Cash Flow (1,011,000) (4,500,000) (4,500,000) 11,700,000
PV of Benefit $8,440,000
PV of Cost $9,378,000
NPV ($938,000)
IRR 9.8%
Development 2-Period Return 25.8%
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decisions and their impact on the project would be much more meaningful than the NPV analysis 
based on a decision at the time zero.  
 
For large-scale projects with extended development period and multiple stages, the sensitivity of 
the NPV and the required return based analyses to underlying assumptions becomes magnified. 
Consider a mixed use development project with the following characteristics: 
• Current market value of the land is $2,700,000. The upfront fee of $300,000 is required 
for design and permitting. Out of $3,000,000, $1,011,000 is attributable to the office 
component, and the remainder is attributable to the residential component. 
• According to the current zoning regulations, one office building and one residential 
building can be built on site. The office building can be developed immediately. However, 
it would take up to 3 years for the residential building to break grounds due to the likely 
permitting complications.  
• The construction of the office building is expected to take 2 years. The total cost is 
estimated to be $9,000,000, with two equal payments of $4,500,000 each year during the 
construction. 
• The office building is expected to generate an annual income of $1,000,000, when 
stabilized in the year 4. The lease-up would take about one year with $500,000 generated 
during the period. 
• The construction of the residential building is also expected to take 2 years. The total cost 
is estimated to be $19,500,000, with two equal payments of $9,750,000 each year during 
the construction. 
• Based on the market research, the cap rates for the office and the residential properties 
are 8% and 7% respectively. For the appropriate discount rates, the growth rate of 2% 
and the spec premium of 1.5% will be added to the market cap rates. 
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Given the above information, it is possible to perform a NPV analysis of the project. Using the 
same method as in Figure 3.1 – Discounting costs with risk-free rate and benefits with risk-
adjusted rate – , the resulting NPV of the project is negative $621,000 as shown in Figure 3.6. 
Following the NPV decision rule, the project should be rejected. Even though this multiple 
phased project has a higher project level blended IRR than the single asset development in Figure 
3.1, it is quite inferior project based on the NPV. This result demonstrates that the longer 
development period and related uncertainties require higher return due the additional risks 
involved. Accordingly, the project’s negative NPV seems well justified. However, given the 
sensitivity of the development project’s NPV, the further test of the analysis should be granted. 
Figure 3.7: Sensitivity of Multiple Phase Project to Change in Asset Prices 
 
% change in Asset Price Project Level IRR NPV
20.0% 28.6% $4,661,000
15.0% 26.1% $3,340,000
10.0% 23.6% $2,020,000
5.0% 20.9% $699,000
0.0% 18.2% ($621,000)
-5.0% 15.3% ($1,941,000)
-10.0% 12.3% ($3,262,000)
-15.0% 9.2% ($4,582,000)
-20.0% 5.9% ($5,902,000)
Figure 3.6: Simple Mixed-Use Multi-Phase Development Project 
 
Office Cap rate (y) 8.0%
Residential Cap rate (y) 7.0%
Long-term Growth rate (g) 2.0%
Spec Premium 1.5%
Riskfree rate 5.0%
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7
Land Cost + Fee 3,000,000
Phase 1: Office
Rental Income 0 0 0 500,000 1,000,000
Stabilized Property Value 0 0 0 12,500,000
Construction Cost 0 4,500,000 4,500,000
Phase 2: Residential
Rental Income 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000,000 2,100,000
Stabilized Property Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 30,000,000
Construction Cost 0 0 0 0 9,750,000 9,750,000
Project Cash Flow (3,000,000) (4,500,000) (4,500,000) 13,000,000 (9,750,000) (9,750,000) 31,000,000
PV Benefit 26,407,000
PV Cost 24,028,000
NPV (621,000)
IRR 18.2%
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The sensitivity analysis to the asset price change in Figure 3.7 shows that there are huge down 
sides from the base scenario and yet only 5% higher asset price would move the project into the 
positive NPV realm.  
 
Since this project has multiple components in it, it is useful to analyze each component 
individually to identify which one loses (gains) most value. As shown in Figure 3.8, it turns out 
that the office component has zero NPV, whereas the residential component loses all the value 
mostly due to the fact that it is planned to begin construction three years later. That is, the 
negative impact on the NPV would be greater with later stage projects as costs are discounted 
with a much lower rate than benefits. In fact, if the construction can begin at the year 1, the 
residential component would generate $2,858,000 of positive NPV, which is much greater than 
the office component would generate. Due to the procedure that requires much higher discount 
rate for benefits than one for costs, the later projects are always less desirable compare to the 
earlier ones from the NPV standpoint, even if they are similar in all the other aspects. This might 
be one of the reasons why developers often times favor Cash-On-Cash return over NPV or IRR. 
From the example, the office building and the residential building each has 39% and 54% 
Figure 3.8: NPV Breakdown of Multiple Phase Project 
 
Year 0 Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 Year 6 Year 7
Phase 1: Office
Rental Income 0 0 0 500,000 1,000,000
Stabilized Property Value 0 0 0 12,500,000
Construction Cost 0 4,500,000 4,500,000
Land Cost + Fee 1,011,000
Office Cash Flow (1,011,000) (4,500,000) (4,500,000) 13,000,000
Office IRR 16.8%
PV of Office Income Flow 9,378,000
PV of Office Cost 8,367,000
Office NPV 0
Phase 2: Residential
Rental Income 0 0 0 0 0 0 1,000,000 2,100,000
Stabilized Property Value 0 0 0 0 0 0 30,000,000
Construction Cost 0 0 0 0 9,750,000 9,750,000
Land Cost + Fee 1,989,000
Office Cash Flow (1,989,000) 0 0 0 (9,750,000) (9,750,000) 31,000,000
Office IRR 18.9%
PV of Residential Income Flow 17,029,000
PV of Residential Cost 15,661,000
Residential NPV (621,000)
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Cash-On-Cash return respectively.5 Evidently, Cash-On-Cash return is not a theoretically sound 
measure because it does not account for any risks or time factor. However, the NPV analysis 
clearly penalizes later stage projects and discourages any long-term commitment on large-scale 
developments. This problem calls for improved analytical tools for valuing long-term 
development projects. 
 
 
3.3. Shortcomings of Discounted Cash Flow based Analyses 
 
As identified in the previous analyses, the NPV and IRR analyses work well for the valuation of a 
project based on a single fixed assumption. However, they are not as useful for real estate 
development projects, due to flexibility in subsequent decisions. Simply requiring higher returns 
for their higher risks does not help much in practice, although it might guide developers to weed 
out poor projects. The shortcomings of DCF based analyses originate from their fundamental 
assumptions. According to Copeland and Keenan (1998a), DCF techniques were developed to 
value investments such as stocks and bonds, and their basic assumption is that investors hold 
them passively. Thus, DCF based models like NPV overlook investors’ capabilities of future 
decision making to alter the original course of a project in response to any future changes. In fact, 
they assume that investors make all the decisions based on their future expectations at the time, 
and then later they do not deviate from the initial decisions made. 
 
De Neufville (1990) goes further to say that the conventional DCF analysis fails to recognize the 
fact that managers manage projects. According to him, this is the critical flaw of the DCF analysis. 
                                                 
5 Cash-on-Cash return is calculated without any consideration for discount factor. It can formally expressed 
as: Cash-on-Cash return = (Built Asset Value – Construction Costs)/Construction Costs = Development 
Profit Margin / Construction Cost. For example, office Cash-on-Cash return = (12,500,000 – 9,000,000) / 
9,000,000 = 38.9%. 
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The DCF procedures assume a single line of development for a project so that a project is carried 
through even if it fails. The analysis simply incorporates the probability of failure into the overall 
expectation of the project.  
 
These flaws of the DCF based analyses are crucial to the analysis of real estate development 
projects, because the decisions related to development projects are spread over the entire 
development period and this give a greater degree of flexibility to adapt to any future changes. 
That is, large-scale development projects are rarely executed as they were planned initially. I 
would argue that the success of any development project depends heavily on the strategic use of 
flexibilities imbedded in the project. 
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Ch. 4. Valuing Flexibility in Real Estate Development Projects 
 
 
 
 
4.1. Decision Tree Analysis (DTA) 
 
Decision Tree Analysis (DTA) is one of the important tools available that takes flexibilities – left 
out from the NPV analysis – into account. It was first advocated by J. Magee in 1964 and has 
remained an important tool for capital investment decisions. DTA is basically a tool that can 
depict strategic future pathways an investor can take based on a number of different future 
outcomes. It shows graphically a decision road map of an investor’s and manager’s strategic 
initiatives and opportunities over time. DTA can be used when future outcomes are uncertain and 
investors have tool to react when new information is arrived in the future. 
 
Prior to exploring DTA in detail, it is necessary to examine the concept of the expected return, 
which is basis of the conventional DCF analysis. According to Bodie et al (2002), the expected 
return of an asset is a probability-weighted average of its return in all future scenarios. Let Pr(s) 
be the probability of scenario s and r(s) be the return in scenario s, the expected return .E(r) can 
be expressed as: 
∑ ⋅=
s
srsrE )()Pr()(  
For example, consider the return for a downtown office building that is sensitive to the overall 
regional economy. For the sake of the analysis, we can assume the following scenario for the next 
year: 
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   Bullish Economy Bearish Economy Economic Crisis 
Probability   .4   .4   .2 
Return    30%   10%   -30% 
 
Applying these values to the formula defined above, the expected return of the office building is: 
=−×+×+×= ))30(2(.)104(.)304(.)( officerE 10% 
The conventional NPV method blindly uses this 10% as the basis of the investment analysis. 
However, it is critical to note that for actively managed investments like real estate development 
projects, managers can take action to prevent losses when the future outcome turns adverse. The 
main idea of DTA is to map out potential decisions so that it would enhance future outcome of a 
project. If an investor acquires an option to buy the office building, instead of buying the office 
immediately, she would not exercise option for a loss. Therefore, the investor’s average return 
would be – without considering the option price and the lost time value of delaying the 
commitment: 
 %16)02(.)104(.)304(.)( .. =×+×+×=optionwofficerE  
As shown, the ability to make decisions when future outcome is known creates value to a project. 
DTA is designed to help investor to maximize the benefit of the sequential decision making. 
 
Decision Tree Analysis incorporates the value of flexibility by explicitly laying out the structure 
of a project in such a way that all uncertainties and the potential decisions to be made on the 
uncertainties are represented as a tree form. According to de Neufville (1990), DTA leads to the 
following three results: 
• Structures the problem, which otherwise would be very confusing due to the complexities 
introduced by uncertainty. 
• Defines optimal choices for any period through an expected value calculation based on 
the consideration of the probabilities and the outcomes of each choice. 
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• Identifies an optimal strategy over many periods of time. 
These benefits of DTA can be used to correct shortcoming of the DCF-based analyses as 
previously identified. DTA illustrates how future decisions could be made as uncertainties 
regarding a project reveal themselves over time. Therefore, it does not assume pre-committing all 
the decisions at the time zero. Unlike the NPV analysis, DTA assumes that investors will learn 
new information about the project and they have flexibilities to change course of action as the 
project proceeds. 
 
Following de Neufville’s approach, a Decision Tree is composed of three basic nodes:  
• Decision nodes (square), where possible decisions are contemplated and a decision made. 
• Chance nodes (circle), where outcomes are determined by events or states of nature. 
Chance nodes have probability of each chance happening, and the sum of the 
probabilities in each chance node equals one. 
• Terminal nodes (triangle), where a project is completed or abandoned. They are the end 
points of the decision tree branches, and they are typically accompanied by terminal 
value of the path.  
In its most basic form, a Decision Tree has series of decision nodes and chance nodes branching 
out to form a tree shaped structure. By assigning probabilities in chance nodes and terminal 
payoffs at the terminal nodes of each branch, it is possible to value the project at each decision 
node. Described formally, the expected value of a risky decision Di is the outcomes weighted by 
their estimated provability of occurrence: 
ij
j
ji OPDEV ⋅= ∑)(  
When there are a number of alternatives choices to be made, the decision rule in DTA is to 
choose the one that offers the best average value, defined as the expected value (EV) above. 
When multiples nodes and branches are involved, EV is calculated backwards from the terminal 
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nodes to the initial node. The following is a simple example of the decision tree regarding an 
investment decision: 
 
The simple analysis in Figure 4.1 identifies T-Bill as a superior investment than risky real estate, 
based on the expected value calculation6. This example is deterministic model in that it assumes 
all the future probabilities of outcomes are already known. It is possible to estimate probabilities 
and payoffs based on past data and experience, and it would not possible to know for sure in most 
cases. The real world application of Decision Tree Analysis would have much more complex 
form and involve numerous variables. The strongest virtue of DTA is that it exposes all the 
uncertainties and the accompanying flexibilities of a project wide open, which otherwise would 
have been treated as a “black box” that only gives a single value estimation. 
                                                 
6 The example in Figure 4.1 does not account for discount rate and time, and therefore does not factor in 
investor’s risk aversion. In this case, the expected value of investing in risky real estate is lower despite the 
potentially greater risks, and thus investing in T-Bill obviously superior to real estate. Another way to 
incorporate risks in this framework would be using a risk adjusted probabilities so that the probability of 
each outcome is adjusted for the risk. However, it would be hard to implement this approach in practice due 
to the difficulties of obtaining objective risk adjusted probabilities.  
Figure 4.1: Simple Decision Tree Analysis of Investment Decision 
 
     4.1.1 Structuring of Decision Tree 
 
     4.1.2 Expected Values of Each Node 
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4.2. Application of Decision Tree Analysis to Real Estate Development Projects 
 
As describe in the previous chapter, real estate development projects involve a sequential decision 
making as they progress. Therefore, they are ideal candidates for Decision Tree Analysis. A 
typical development project involves decisions on purchasing a piece of land, choosing a right 
program and capacity, choosing an optimal timing to build, etc. We can analyze office 
development project in Figure 3.1 using DTA. The previous analysis, fully committing to build 
an office building from the outset, resulted in zero NPV. It is important to note that the benefit 
side of the equation is highly uncertain, yet the costs side is relatively predictable. Thus, there is a 
value in waiting for higher benefits in the future. The current value of the asset to be developed is 
$9,378,000, which is the present value of future benefits. The cost of project is same as the 
current asset value, and it is composed of $1,011,000 of the land value and $8,367,000 of the 
construction costs. Figure 4.2 illustrates the decision tree that incorporates waiting up to 2 years7 
before committing for the construction based on the following assumptions: 
• There are two discrete possibility of future outcome in the office asset prices based on up 
market and down market. 
• During the good market, the asset price will increase 22.1%, and during the down market, 
it will decrease 18.1%8. 
• Probabilities of the up-market and the down-market are 60% and 40% respectively. 
• Office would generate an annual income of 8% of its value. This would be lost income to 
the investor if she decides to wait for a better market. 
                                                 
7 Typical land development would have perpetual waiting option. However, this assumption is used for the 
purpose of this decision analysis. Perpetual option on land will be examined in the next chapter. 
8 Upward move and downward move of the asset price is estimated using the following formula based on 
20% volatility of a typical real estate: teu δσ= , ted δσ−= . 
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• An annual rate of 11.5% for an equivalent office building is used to discount future 
payoffs.9 
 
                                                 
9 This figure is for illustration purpose only and is not theoretically correct. Obviously, the discount rate for 
development project should be higher than this. Discount rates for Decision Tree Analysis are investigated 
further later in this chapter. 
Figure 4.2: Decision Tree Analysis of Development Project 
 
     4.2.1. Structuring of Decision Tree 
 
 
     4.2.2. Expected Value Calculation 
 
 
   
 
 - 36 -  
Bases on these assumptions, the DTA method reveals that there might be additional value in 
waiting for better outcome. However, the validity of this method is entirely dependent on the 
assumptions. More importantly, the probability and the discount rate are two most critical inputs 
in the model, yet entirely subjective numbers are used. Therefore, unless the assumptions are 
known for sure, a sensitivity analysis should be performed to see the robustness of the analysis 
and the boundaries of the decision rule. In figure 4.3, the lowest up-market probability for waiting 
decision to be optimal is 50% with the given discount rate. Also, with the 60% constant 
probability of up-market, the highest discount rate for waiting decision to be optimal is 29%. 
These results can be compared to the market data, other similar type of development projects, or 
developers’ past experience to make more sensible judgment on the outcome of the analysis.10  
 
 
In the case of multiple-stage development projects, the decision tree analysis is even more useful 
due to the sequential decision nodes built in these projects. We can analyze the two-stage mixed 
use project from Figure 3.6 using DTA. Based on the previous NPV analysis, the project had the 
negative NPV of $621,000, and should be rejected based on the NPV decision rule. As the 
previous analysis revealed, the negative NPV was due to the second phase residential component, 
                                                 
10 More rigorous way to identify probabilities and discount rates is possible by using DTA in conjunction 
with Real Options model. See the chapter 4.9 for details. 
Figure 4.3: Decision Tree Sensitivity Analyses 
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and the first phase, in fact, had zero NPV. Also the reason for the second phase’s negative NPV 
was mostly due to the conventional NPV procedures that assume the full commitment of all the 
components of the project at the beginning. The following rather simplified assumptions are made 
for the sake of a DTA analysis: 
• The first phase office component can be built any time between the first year and the 
third year, and when the developer made commitment to build the office, she would have 
a right to build a residential building in the third year. For the sake of simplicity, the 
analysis assumes that the developer will decide whether to build the residential 
component or not at the end of the third year (There is no more waiting option after the 
third year). 
• Values of both office and residential properties are correlated with the market movement 
in that during an up-market asset price rises 22.1% and during a down-market, asset price 
falls by 18.1%. 
• The office building would generate the annual income of 8% of its value and the lost 
income should be accounted for when the developer decides to wait for a better market.  
• Probabilities of up and down-markets are estimated to be 60% and 40% respectively. 
• 20% discount rate for the future profit is assumed by the developer. 
Based on these assumptions, it is possible to map out the future market conditions and 
accompanying strategies for the developer as in figure 4.4. Then, the Expected Value of the tree 
can calculated moving backwards from the terminal nodes. The calculations performed in figure 
4.5 gives the expected value of $4,337,000. Since the land was purchased for $3,000,000, the 
NPV of the project becomes positive $1,337,000, which would be high enough to compensate for 
the initial negative NPV of $621,000. In other words, the value incorporating flexibilities outlined 
above is 83% higher than the value without any flexibility. The sensitivity analysis performed in 
figure 4.6 illustrates that, if the upside potential is greater than 50%, there is some value in 
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Figure 4.4: Decision Tree Analysis of Multiple-Stage Development Project 
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Figure 4.5: Expected Value Calculation of Multiple-Stage Development Project 
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waiting for better market conditions. Also, with the 60% probability of up-market, the flexible 
strategy would be optimal with a discount rate lower than 33.3%. Precise value of the flexibility 
would depend on the reliability of the discount rate and the probability assumption. However, this 
simplified example demonstrates that it is essential to incorporate flexibility into the analysis of 
large-scale and multi-phase projects. 
 
 
Another issue to be pointed out is related to the determination of the discount rate for each node. 
In this example, a single discount rate based on the developer’s subjective experience was used.  
However, it is evident that as the project progresses, the risk characteristic of the project also 
changes. In other words, real estate development projects are in part a learning process in that 
some future uncertainties become known as time passes. For example, once the developer knows 
that there were two consecutive up-markets, the payoff in the year three would be much less risky 
than when it was valued from the first year. Therefore, all the nodes in a decision tree would have 
different risk levels, and they should have corresponding discount rates. In realty, it is close to 
impossible to calibrate discount rates for each node, and for most cases, some degree of 
subjective judgment is required. 
 
Figure 4.6: Decision Tree Sensitivity Analyses 
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As shown in the previous two analyses, Decision Tree Analysis corrects the analysis performed 
using the NPV method by incorporating flexibilities of future decision makings. DTA should be 
used in conjunction with the conventional NPV method whenever there are flexibilities built in a 
project, especially when the project involves multiple stages. The NPV analysis would 
systematically undervalue projects that have future phases of development, and without taking 
flexibilities into consideration, long-term projects would be rejected most of the time based on the 
NPV decision rule. However, DTA needs to be performed with much care to be an effective tool. 
Otherwise, it could lead to a distorted outcome and thus a poor investment decision. The 
following chapter will examine shortcomings of DTA to aware of, for a better implementation of 
DTA. 
 
4.3. Shortcomings of Decision Tree Analysis 
 
Decision Tree Analysis is a great analytical tool that complements weaknesses of the 
conventional Discounted Cash Flow based tools. Compared to the passive investment approach of 
the NPV analysis, DTA is much closer to the reality of actively managed real estate development 
projects. However, DTA has its own shortcomings and they should be clearly identified and 
understood by investors to be implemented for real world projects. The problems of applying 
DTA have been identified by many authors including Meyers (2002) and de Neufville (1990). 
 
As Meyers points out, the difficulty of DTA’s implementation comes from the sheer complexity 
of real world decision making processes. For any given future events, there would be a number of 
alternative actions mangers could choose for real world projects. Also there would be countless 
variables that would influence projects’ outcome. If we start covering all the possible variables 
and choices, “decision tree analysis” would quickly become “decision bush analysis” as the 
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number of paths increase geometrically with the number of decisions, outcome variables and 
number of states considered for each variable. This would make any analytic work challenging 
and time consuming. At the same time, investors would loose any insight on critical decisions for 
the success due to its complexity. For instance, the analysis performed in Figure 4.4 and 4.5 only 
involves three variables – possibility of up/down market and percentage increase (decrease) of the 
asset prices based on given market condition –, and it had only two states of market. Even then, 
the analysis was quite complicated. Therefore, to make DTA useful, it is important to identify 
critical variables and conditions for success, and focus on them. As Meyers puts it, “decision 
trees are like grapevines: they are productive only if they are vigorously pruned.” 
 
One of the major simplifications is that decision trees require finite number of discrete 
alternatives. In the real world, there might be infinite number of outcomes and they might be 
continuous. Instead of a fixed percentage increase in an asset price, price change would span a 
range of values. This simplification can distort the outcome of the analysis, yet incorporating too 
many alternatives would make decision tree too complex to be useful. 
 
Another related problem is that DTA eventually involves some degree of subjective judgment on 
input variables as well as resulting outcomes. If there are extensive data available for similar 
projects as the one being analyzed, this would not be too much of a problem. However, many new 
projects are unique and it would be difficult to come by a reliable data. In this case, the analysis 
should be performed based on subjective and most reasonable input assumptions, and verified 
with a rigorous sensitivity analysis. With help of software package such as TreeAge®, it is also 
possible to perform a Monte Carlo simulation. 
  
In most cases, uncertainties are gradually removed as a project progresses, and this changes the 
risk of a project. Also, certain events change the risk characteristic of a project. For instance, if 
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the underlying asset price drops during the development, the operating leverage of the project 
increases due to the fixed cost. This effectively makes the project riskier, and the opposite 
happens when the asset price rises. Due to the constantly changing risk levels of a project, using a 
single discount rate in each year is incorrect. This change in risk can be easily identifiable in a 
conceptual level. However, determining appropriate discount rate at every node would not be 
possible, due to the limited available data, and it would be practically unfeasible for complex 
decision trees. In other word, decision trees do not provide investors an appropriate tool to value 
future cash flows on the risk-adjusted basis. 
 
It is also worth noting that Decision Tree Analysis is not a substitute of the conventional NPV 
analysis but it is a complementary method. The correct usage of DTA involves the application of 
Discounted Cash Flow method. If the initial DCF valuation is poorly done, the outcome of DTA 
would not be reliable.   
 
Decision Tree Analysis can help investors identify the future strategic decision choices, and 
provide a clearer view of the future cash flows and risks of a project. However, due to the 
subjective assumptions required in most DTA procedures, it is challenging to use it as an 
objective valuation tool.  More often than not, it would more useful as a strategic tool for future 
decisions than a precise valuation tool. 
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4.4. Real Options Analysis 
 
Real Options is a method that uses the option theory to evaluate physical or real assets such as 
buildings and plants, as opposed to stocks, bonds and other financial instruments. Real Options 
was first advocated by Meyers (1977) in his analysis of corporate borrowings. Following the 
Copeland and Antikarov (2001)’s definition, Real Options is “the right, but not the obligation, to 
take an action (e.g., deferring, expanding contraction, or abandoning) at a predetermined cost 
called the exercise price, for a predetermined period of time – the life of the option.” This 
definition is almost identical to that of financial options in that the only difference seems the type 
of assets that investors have options on. Accordingly, just like financial options, the value of Real 
Options depends on six basic variables: value of the underlying risky asset, exercise price, time to 
expiration, standard deviation of the value of the underlying asset, risk free rate and dividends 
rate if any (Copeland and Antikarov). Conceptually, both Decision Tree Analysis and Real 
Options are tools to value flexibilities of investments. However, the major benefits of Real 
Options is that it is much more robust valuation tool by accommodating techniques developed for 
the valuation of financial options. For instance, in contrast to DTA, Real Options can avoid 
guessing a correct discount rate for each future outcome by using the arbitrage free method and 
the risk neutral probabilities. In practice, Real Options can be used for largely two purposes: 
valuation of flexibility to complement the conventional NPV approach and formulation of 
proactive strategies to capture additional values, market shares, revenues, etc. 
 
4.4.1. Real Options as Valuation Tool 
Copeland and Weiner (1990) suggest that Real Option can be a remedy for problems of 
underinvestment resulted from the wide-spread use – often applied incorrectly – of the 
conventional NPV analysis: 
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A fascinating aspect of flexibility options is that in certain cases it is possible to 
estimate their value precisely. Often, the extra value added by flexibility is 
completely missing from such traditional valuation methodologies as net present 
value techniques. In fact, one contributing factors to underinvestment in the 
United States may be the slavish dedication of its MBA-trained mangers to NPV. 
Have you ever sat at a meeting and listened to a careful NPV analysis, known in 
your gut that the recommendation had to be wrong, but could not put your finger 
on the reason? The missing ingredient may be the value of flexibility. 
 
Real Options can be valued by finding out a financial option structure that is equivalent to the real 
world situation being analyzed. For instance, the option to expand a project when a favorable 
market condition arrives is similar to a financial “call” option. If the cost of expansion is fixed, it 
is equivalent to the strike price of financial options. When the payoff of the expansion is above 
the fixed cost, the expansion option would be “in the money.” Following a similar approach, if 
Real Options in an investment can be clearly identified, it can be valued using techniques 
developed for financial options. 
 
Most projects that involve sequential decision making process would have Real Options built in 
them. Without recognizing the value of Real Options, there would be the problem of 
underinvestment, and investors are likely to pass up investments with great potential returns. 
R&D projects are a popular example of the Real Options valuation. Most R&D projects usually 
do not make sense from the NPV standpoint. However, the most value of R&D is created when it 
become successful and opens up new market for a company. In other words, R&D is a right to 
acquire an exclusive and profitable market for the company at a cost incurred during the R&D 
process. As Copeland and Weiner (1990) put it, R&D situation is similar to “paying to see the 
next card” that provides an option to move forwards by investing more or abandoning the project. 
Real Options has a critical importance as a valuation tool because, prior to its introduction, a 
method that can value flexibilities inherent in many projects was not available. Investors and 
mangers had to either simply ignore any values of flexibilities or follow their subjective 
judgments. 
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 The best feature of Real Options as a valuation tool is that it can be directly used in conjunction 
with the conventional NPV method. Mun (2002) proposed the concept of expanded net present 
value (eNPV), which is combination of the option value and the value from the conventional NPV 
method: 
 NPV = Benefits – Costs 
 Options Value = Benefits of Options – Costs of Acquiring Options 
 eNPV = NPV + Options Value 
This approach can be applied to any valuation exercise. When a project is deterministic with no 
flexibilities, Options Value would simply be zero. The greatest advantage of the eNPV approach 
is that it forces investors to think about options in their investments or projects. Therefore, it can 
help investor recognizing value of flexibilities in projects, and at the same time, avoiding 
potential mistakes of underinvestment. 
  
4.4.2. Real Options as Strategic Tool 
Real Options is not only a conceptually superior valuation tool but also a strategic tool. 
According to Leslie and Michaels (1997), Real Options as a valuation tool deals with certain 
“reactive flexibilities.” On the other hand, Real Options as a strategic tool identifies “proactive 
flexibilities” – the flexibility that can be strategically placed and built into projects. De Neufville 
and Neely (2001) regard this strategic use of options as “Options in Projects” as opposed to 
“Options on Projects.” According to them, options in projects are options that involve a change 
in system design or underlying technology as uncertainty is resolved. 
 
Real Options is particularly useful compare to other methods because it clearly identifies what 
drives values in projects with a flexible design. Based on the variables in financial options, Real 
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Options’ basic variables can be structured in a way to maximize the potential value of a project. 
Using variables typical to financial options as the basis, Leslie and Michaels (1997) identifies six 
major variables that can strategically improve the options value in a project. The following is the 
list of variables in financial options and their implication for Real Options (Leslie and Michaels): 
• Stock Price (S) – Evidently higher stock price would give higher value. For Real Options, 
it is hard to observe the market price of the underlying asset. Thus, the present value of 
expected cash flows is used instead. One major difference between financial and real 
options is that the owner of financial options cannot affect the value of the underlying 
assets. But, managers who operate real assets can raise its value and the value of Real 
Options at the same time (Copeland and Antikarov).  
• Strike Price (X) – As the strike price of an option increases, the value of the call options 
decreases and the value of the put increases. In Real Options, the strike price is 
equivalent to the present value of all the fixed costs expected over the lifetime of the 
investment opportunity. Therefore, cutting costs by strategies such as leveraging 
economies of scale increases value of a project and its call-like Real Options at the same 
time. 
• Uncertainty (σ) – Higher uncertainties increase the value of an option and this is critical 
difference from the NPV approach. Higher uncertainties would require higher discount 
rate and it will decrease the value from the NPV perspective. By placing options like 
features in a project, investors can put a limit on downside yet fully exploit the potential 
upside. For highly risky projects, options strategy can dramatically improve their values.  
• Time to Expiration (T) – As time to expiration increases so does the value of an option. 
In Real Options, managers can extend the opportunity’s duration using strategies such as 
acquiring renewable licensing. 
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• Dividends (δ) – Dividends are considered as costs incurred to keep an option afloat. 
Reducing the value lost by waiting is even more critical for Real Options, because the 
cost of waiting could be extremely high if an early entrant can preempt later followers. 
The lost of value by preemption can be minimized by discouraging others to exercise 
their options. 
• Risk-free Interest Rate (r) – The risk-free rate is not something investor can change. 
However, it is worth noting that any expected increase in the interest rate raises option 
value, despite its negative effect on NPV, because it reduces the present value of the 
exercise price. 
When strategically placing options features into projects, it is critical to identify which of above 
variables affect the options value the most. After that, they have to be carefully compared to the 
costs of placing or acquiring them. Options way of thinking can help investors understanding how 
options can create additional value for their projects, and what kinds of options should be 
acquired to maximize the potential of the project. The essence of strategic Real Options is that it 
fundamentally changes investor’s attitude towards uncertainties. As opposed to the traditional 
strategy of avoiding uncertainties, Real Options strategy seeks gains from uncertainties and 
maximization of learning process during the course of a project (Leslie and Michaels). This new 
attitude will open up a wider range of possible actions and is crucial for any options thinking on 
real world projects. 
 
4.4.3 Types of Real Options 
Many authors have identified types of Real Options that can be found in real projects and come 
up with various ways to apply them in the real world (Trigeorigis, 1993; Mun, 2002, Copeland 
and Antikarov, 2001; Howell et al, 2001, Brealey and Myers, 2003; and Hull, 2003). The 
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following is the list of Real Options that is most widely recognized and implemented. All of them 
are also applicable to real estate projects in different circumstances: 
 
 “Option to defer” captures the value of waiting when investors hold an option to buy valuable 
asset. For instance, one can wait to see if output prices justify constructing a building or plant, or 
developing a field. This is equivalent to a simple financial call option, and it captures time value 
of a call option to invest. It also leads to a useful decision rule of deferring exercise until the time 
value of waiting becomes zero. Typical real estate land development is a case of option to defer in 
that buying land is an option to build a property when its benefit exceeds its costs. 
 
“Time to build option (staged investment)” is also called “compound expansion option.” Staging 
investment as a series of outlays creates the option to abandon the enterprise in midstream if new 
information is unfavorable. Each stage can be viewed as an option on the value of subsequent 
stages, and valued as a compound option. Multi-stage real estate development projects can be 
considered as compound expansion option. 
 
“Scaling Option (e.g., to expand; to contract; to shut down or restart)” is an option to change 
course of the project depending on market conditions. If market conditions are more favorable 
than expected, the firm can expand the scale of production or accelerate resource utilization. On 
the contrary, if conditions are less favorable than expected, it can reduce the scale of operations. 
In extreme cases, production may halt or start up again. When applied to real estate, an option to 
sublease the space can be interpreted as a contract option.  
 
“Option to abandon” is a put option that values manager’s option to shut down project and 
realize the resale value of the investment, when market turns sour. If the salvage value is 
reasonably high, the option to abandon can substantially cut down the negative effect of the 
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market downturn. Most development projects would have this option until it was built and leased-
up. 
 
“Option to switch” reflects the fact that mangers can switch inputs and outputs in response to the 
market fluctuations. If buildings are designed with flexibilities in mind, they can provide switch 
options to investors by offering to switch one use to another (e.g. office to residential) depending 
on the market condition. 
 
“Growth option” is a crucial when early investment (e.g., R&D, lease on undeveloped land or oil 
reserves, strategic acquisition, and Information network/infrastructure) is a prerequisite or link in 
a chain or interrelated projects, opening up future growth opportunities. This is another version of 
sequential compound expansion option. Costs incurred for permitting during the development 
process can be regarded as an option to provide a growth opportunity. 
 
“ Rainbow option” is an option that depend on more than one type of uncertainty. Most real 
world cases are affected by a number of uncertainties such as output and input prices, demand 
quantities, interest rates, etc. Real estate development projects would be at least affected by 
uncertainties of construction cost and market demand. 
 
As listed above, a majority of real world decisions in response to uncertainties can be model as a 
Real Options or combination of different types of Real Options. When applied to real world 
projects, even simple projects involve multiple options to choose from. Managers and investors 
often have to make strategic decisions on daily basis. To model this complex real world situation, 
it would crucial to identify uncertainties that matter the most. If investors can effectively mitigate 
some risks, options valuation should focus on the risks that they have to bear and would affect the 
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project outcome in a meaningful way. Therefore, simplification without damaging integrity of 
analysis is one of the most important techniques for the Real Options Analysis. 
 
4.5 Basis of Real Options Valuation 
 
4.5.1 Stochastic Processes and Geometric Brownian Motion 
One of the fundamental processes required for the valuation of an option is to model the 
uncertainties of underlying assets. Based on the assumption that the uncertainties of underlying 
assets is their randomness in price change, a mathematical model called Markov stochastic 
process is widely used to account for such uncertainties. The concept of Wiener Process, also 
referred to as Brownian Motion, is used to model stock prices’ randomness and it is also 
applicable to a variety of other assets following similar patterns. Wiener Process is a type of 
Markov stochastic process with a mean of zero and variance of 1 per year (Hull, 2003). Wiener 
Process is formally expressed as follows: 
 tz δεδ =  
where, ε is a random drawing from a standardized normal distribution, and  δz is the change 
during a small period of time δt. The value of δz for any two intervals of time δt is independent, 
and δz itself has a normal distribution with mean of 0=zδ , standard deviation of tz δδ = , and 
variance of tz δδ = . 
 
Based on Wiener Process, the process for change in stock prices is modeled as a process called 
Geometric Brownian Motion (Hull): 
dzdt
S
dS σµ +=  
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where S is stock price, µ is stock’s expected return (drift rate), σ is the volatility of stock price and 
dz represents Wiener Process identified above. It is important to note that this process assumes 
constant rate of required return and volatility (Hull). 
 
Dixit and Pindyck (1994) go one step further to introduce other kinds of stochastic processes 
including mean-reverting processes and jump-diffusion process. It is not crucial for average 
investors to manipulate these mathematical models to value Real Options. However, the 
assumptions that these models are based on have to be recognized since it is closely related to the 
interpretation of any Real Options Analysis that will be introduced in the next chapter. 
 
4.5.2 Arbitrage-Free Pricing Method 
Another break-through in options valuation comes from the concept of no arbitrage. Arbitrage 
opportunities occur when the same security or asset is traded in different prices, or when different 
assets with identical payoff and risk are traded in different prices. In theses cases, arbitrager can 
make risk-less profit buying an asset in one market and selling it in the other, or buying the 
Figure 4.7: Geometric Brownian Motion of Asset Price 
 
 
Source: Crystal Ball Online Help, Decisioneering Inc.
   
 
 - 53 -  
under-priced asset and selling overpriced one. If we assume that markets are efficient, arbitrage 
opportunities would not occur, and even if it does, it would instantly disappear because rational 
investors would take advantage of the condition immediately. Hence, arbitrage-free pricing is 
based on the idea that assets or financial instruments with same payoff and risks should be priced 
same. 
 
This idea provided a break-through in the options pricing because payoffs in options can be 
replicated with the combination of underlying assets and borrowing (or lending). For stocks and 
bonds, we can observe their prices very precisely, and thus prices of options on stocks and bonds 
can be calculated fairly accurately. Furthermore, when asset prices are already known, it is 
possible to use the concept of “risk neutral probability” in conjunction with the replicating 
portfolio method. Adopted from Brealey and Meyer (2003)’s Certainty Equivalent Cash Flow, the 
value of replicating portfolio can be discounted using risk-free rate – risk neutral probabilities are 
calculated  based on the idea that certain cash flow should be discounted at a risk-free rate. 
Assuming that we know the range of future asset prices and the current asset price, the probability 
can be derived since it is the only remaining variable in the equation. This technique effectively 
avoids the problems of determining discount rate for each node when Decision Tree Analysis is 
used. The replication portfolio based on no-arbitrage assumption and the concept of risk neutral 
method are also basic assumption of the following options valuation method, and at the same time 
a source of the models’ weaknesses. 
 
4.6. Real Options Valuation Methods 
 
Based on the two fundamental theories outlined in the previous section, there are a number of 
different methods that can calculate the value of an option. In this section, the four most 
   
 
 - 54 -  
recognized methods for options valuation are introduced and tested with the simple development 
example used in Figure 3.1:  
 
4.6.1. Closed-Form Solutions  
Closed-form solutions are mathematical equations that can be solved given a set of input 
assumptions. They provide the quickest and easiest way to value options simple enough to fit in 
one of the pre-established structures. The most widely used closed-form solution for options 
valuation is the Black-Scholes formula. The model was developed in the early 1970s by Fisher 
Black, Myron Scholes, and Robert Merton, and it was considered a major breakthrough in options 
pricing. The followings equations are the Black-Scholes formulas for the prices of a European 
call option on dividend-paying stock (Hull, 2003): 
)()( 2100 dNeXdNeSC
rTqT ⋅⋅−⋅⋅= −−  
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N(·) represents the cumulative probability distribution function for a standardized normal 
distribution11, X is the strike price, r is the risk-free rate, y is the dividend payout rate and T is the 
time to maturity. The office development example used in Figure 3.1 and Figure 4.2 can be easily 
applied to this formula. Following the same assumptions as the Decision Tree Analysis, current 
underlying asset value (S0) is the present value of the office $9,378,000; the strike price (X) is the 
present value of the construction costs $8,367,000; the standard deviation of office prices (σ) is 
20%; the time to maturity (T) is 3 years; and the risk-free rate (r) is 5%. For real estate application, 
dividend payout (y) should be equivalent to cap rate, and 8% cap rate for this example. Under 
these input assumptions, we can calculate the value of waiting to develop up to three years: 
                                                 
11 It can be calculated using a normal distribution table, or the Excel function “NORMSDIST.” 
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 24269.0
32.0
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32.0
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 N(d1) = NORMSDIST(0.24269) = 0.5959, N(d2) = NORMSDIST(-0.10372) = 0.4587 
000,092,14587.0000,367,85959.0000,378,9 305.0308.00 =×⋅−×⋅= ×−×− eeC  
Since the residual land value is $1,011,000, the option value of the land is $81,00012 (1,092,000 – 
1,011,000). In this case, the land as a call option has a higher value over the land as a residual 
value despite the potential loss of income. Starting to develop immediately based on the 
conventional NPV decision rule would be in fact a negative eNPV, when factoring in the option 
value of waiting.  
 
Unlike the above example, most land developments do not have maturity. That is, once an 
investor acquires a piece of land, she has an option to wait until the value of the fully developed 
land is maximized – she can evidently wait forever. This is a type of perpetual call option, and it 
cannot be solved using Black-Scholes formula because it require T (time to maturity). Geltner and 
Miller (2001) introduced Samuelson-McKean formula13 as the “Black-Scholes formula of real 
estate.” The Samuelson-McKean formula is formally expressed as the following equations: 
⎟⎠
⎞⎜⎝
⎛
V
VK)-V(  =  L *
*
η
 
where 
1
* −⋅= η
ηKV   
                                                 
12 It is important to note that Black-Scholes formula is only capable of valuing European options. Therefore, 
this calcuted option value is based on the assumption that the developer cannot start to developer in the 
year one and two. Since the underlying asset is paying dividends, it is likely that early exercise will be 
optimal. Therefore, the option value is likely to increase, if we treat this optiona as a call. This is one of the 
weaknesses of using Black-Scholes formula. 
13 It was first developed by Paul Samuelson and Henry McKean for pricing perpetual American warrants. 
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 and 
V = Current Value of underlying asset   K = Strike price (cost of building asset) 
σ = Volatility of underlying asset   y = Dividend payout ratio (Cap rate) 
r = Risk-free rate     η= Option Elasticity 
V*=Critical value of underlying asset at and above which it is optimal to immediately 
exercise the option. 
We can analyze the same example used for Black-Scholes, except that there would be no maturity 
date:  
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Without the maturity, the option value of the land becomes substantially higher as expected. More 
importantly, the Samuelson-McKean formula provides investors with other useful information, 
such as the optimal exercise price (V*) and the hurdle benefit/cost ratio (V*/K)14. 
 
These ready-made formulas provide simple means to calculate the value of the land as an option. 
They are especially useful for straight forward land development projects. They provide the 
approximate value of land based on its inherent options structure, and also some guidance 
regarding their investment strategies. 
 
                                                 
14 For instance, based on V*/K, investors can find out the optimal profit margin for a development project, 
assuming they know the volatility and the yield of the asset.  
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4.6.2. Partial Differential Equation 
According to Howell et al (2001), the partial differential equation is an equation that predicts how 
one variable (option value) would change if at least two other variables (underlying asset price 
and time) make small changes. Partial differential equations are typically derived from the 
mathematical model that simulates the behavior of the underlying asset, such as Geometric 
Brownian Motion, and solving this model with the concept of no arbitrage and the Ito Calculus 
(Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). Since partial differential equations only say changes in values, they do 
not provide a unique solution by themselves. It can only have unique solutions when some 
boundary conditions are determined (Howell et al). For instance, the previously introduced Black-
Scholes formula is nothing but a solution of Black-Scholes partial differential equation: 
2
2
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Black-Scholes formula for a non-dividend paying European call option is the solution to the 
above partial differential equation with the boundary condition Max{ST – X, 0}. 
 
Many academic researches on Real Options are dedicated to creating and improving models for 
different circumstances based on partial differential equation approach. Assuming input data are 
correct, this approach provides accurate values of an option, and it can model conditions that 
cannot be done in other methods. However, it involves such arcane mathematical skills as 
stochastic calculus and dynamic programming. Therefore, it is highly unlikely that average 
practitioner can have a handle on this procedure. Also in many cases, the resulting models do not 
provide analytical solutions. For these reasons, the partial differential equation approach is not 
going to be used for the analysis of the case and other examples in this paper. 
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4.6.3. Binomial Tree 
Binomial tree method is a popular options valuation model due to its conceptual clarity and ease 
of use. This model is especially helpful for valuing Real Options due to the fact that it is flexible 
enough to be modified based on different structures and intuitive enough to be used by average 
practitioners. It graphically shows how future uncertainties unfold, and it is quite similar to 
Decision Tree in a way it incorporates flexibilities of future decisions. The concept of the risk 
neutral probability and no-arbitrage explicitly play crucial role in this approach. The same 
example is used to illustrate the binomial tree method. Instead of using European call options 
structure, the example in Figure 3.1 is valued as an American call with three years of maturity as 
shown below. 
 
 To solve the option value from the binomial tree, we need to find out up movement (u) and down 
movement of the asset prices, and risk neutral probability (q) of the up movement. The 
movements of asset prices can be estimated by their volatility, and the risk neutral probability can 
be calculated by solving for resulting probabilities when a risk-free discount rate is used instead 
of a risk-adjusted rate: 
Figure 4.8: Binomial Tree with Asset Prices (P) and Call Option Payoff (C) 
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 where 
σ = Volatility of underlying asset y = Dividend payout ratio (Cap rate)15 
r = Risk-free rate   δt = time steps16 
Once we know these variables, we can layout evolving asset prices from the starting node to the 
terminal nodes.                        
 0SuSu ⋅= ,  0SdSd ⋅= ,  0SduSud ⋅⋅= ,  . . . 
On the other hand, options payoffs can be computed by starting from the terminal nodes and 
move backwards. The value at the starting cell becomes the price of the option. For instance, Cuu 
can be calculated as follows: 
 }0,],)1([{ XSCqqCeMaxC uuuuduuu
tr
uu −⋅−+= − δ  
Following this procedure, u and q is computed to be 1.2214 and 0.3768 respectively. With the 
underlying asset price of $9,378,000, the construction cost (strike price) of $8,367,000, 20% 
volatility and 5% risk-free rate, the value of the land as an American call option with three years 
to maturity can be calculated as in figure 4.9: 
 
The resulting value of the land is $1,342,00017 and it implies the option value of $331,000. This is 
much higher than the value of $81,000 calculated using the Black-Scholes formula because early 
exercises on shaded nodes in Figure 4.9 are optimal. It is however lower than the value from the 
Samuelson-McKean formula since longer maturity increases the value of an option. 
                                                 
15 The risk neutral probability is calculated assuming continuous dividend payout of y. 
16 If an option has a one year maturity and the binomial tree has 10 steps, δt is 0.1. 
17 It is important to note that this value is only approximate solution, due to the assumption made to solve 
this options value. 
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Many authors who advocate Real Options model in practice favor the binomial tree approach 
(Mun, 2002; Copeland and Antikarov, 2001; Arman and Kulatilaka, 1999). It is because the 
model is much easier to explain and implement, and at the same time, it provides a great deal of 
flexibility since analysts can customize payoffs and structures in each node. Also, when the early 
exercise is possible (i.e. American options), the Black-Scholes formula cannot be used and the 
binomial model can be an alternative. The greatest benefit of the binomial tree might be that it 
can be used in conjunction with decision trees. This “hybrid” approach is promoted by de 
Neufville and Neely (2001); and Copeland and Antikarov (2001). For example, from the overall 
Real Options structure, Decision Tree Analysis can be used instead only for the part that does not 
have reliable historical data. 
 
4.6.4. Valuation by Monte-Carlo Simulation 
Monte-Carlo can simulate real life price movements of underlying assets by randomly generating 
values for uncertain variables repeatedly. In Monte-Carlo simulation, variables had defined 
probability distribution. During a simulation, random numbers are drawn from the pre-defined 
Figure 4.9: Valuing Land as an American Call Option using Binomial Tree 
 
17,087,830
8,720,830
13,990,332
5,623,332
11,454,315 11,454,315
3,087,315 3,087,315
9,378,000 9,378,000
1,341,570 1,106,478
7,678,057 7,678,057
396,556 0
6,286,261
0
5,146,756
0  
 
*Shading indicates where an option is exercised. 
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probabilities. The simulation method is especially useful to value options with multiple variables, 
which are hard to be modeled in a binomial tree. European options can be easily calculated with 
simulation, but it is very hard to solve American options, when early exercises can be optimal18. 
For a European Option valuation, a series of forecast asset values are created typically using the 
Geometric Brownian Motion, and the mean of the option payoff at the terminal node is 
discounted back to the present using a risk-free rate. This value is equivalent to the option price. 
                                                 
18 There are several methodologies of using Monte Carlo simulation to value American options, suggested 
by a number of academics. However, it would require a complex programming to use them in practice. For 
details on these methods, see Hull (2003) pp. 474-478.  
Figure 4.10: Monte Carlo Simulations for a simple development option 
 
Input Assumptions
PV of Underlying Asset 9,378,000 year Simulate step Value
PV of Cost (strike price) 8,367,000 0.00 9,378,000
Volatility of Underlying Asset 20.00% 0.10 1.238677 1.076097 10,091,640
Income Payout Rate 8.00% 0.20 0.773311 1.044887 10,544,620
Risk Free Rate 5.00% 0.30 -0.204888 0.982202 10,356,947
Years to Maturity 3 0.40 2.903625 1.195592 12,382,682
0.50 0.473043 1.025231 12,695,109
0.60 0.493995 1.02659 13,032,676
0.70 -0.184916 0.983443 12,816,901
0.80 0.656493 1.037195 13,293,629
0.90 -1.171383 0.923962 12,282,803
1.00 -0.468523 0.965961 11,864,706
1.10 1.189311 1.072743 12,727,777
1.20 1.583583 1.099829 13,998,376
1.30 -2.0538 0.873809 12,231,903
1.40 1.106739 1.067155 13,053,338
1.50 -0.377257 0.971553 12,682,005
1.60 1.295821 1.079993 13,696,482
1.70 1.745272 1.111134 15,218,621
1.80 1.954272 1.125918 17,134,924
1.90 -0.303351 0.976105 16,725,477
2.00 -0.128216 0.986976 16,507,652
2.10 -0.193014 0.98294 16,226,030
2.20 0.578899 1.032118 16,747,174
2.30 -1.198501 0.922378 15,447,229
2.40 0.775888 1.045057 16,143,235
2.50 0.263231 1.011716 16,332,374
2.60 0.410292 1.02117 16,678,133
2.70 -0.3904 0.970745 16,190,220
2.80 0.8861 1.052367 17,038,053
2.90 0.919289 1.054578 17,967,961
3.00 0.222827 1.009134 18,132,086
Option Value 8,404,887
0.1 Time Step Path-Dependent Simulation
0.1 time step simulation
0
2,500,000
5,000,000
7,500,000
10,000,000
12,500,000
15,000,000
17,500,000
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The following procedure is a simplified method for valuing European options with Monte-Carlo 
simulation (Mun, 2002). Figure 4.10 is an example of spreadsheet set up using Excel® and 
Crystal Ball® software, based on the development project in figure 3.1. The following is the 
procedure used for the simulation in figure 4.10: 
 
1. Determine how many time steps to use. As in the binomial model, the finer time steps 
would result in more reliable outcome.  
2. Based on the Geometric Brownian Motion, the behavior of the stock price movement can 
be modeled as, 
dzdt
S
dS σµ += , then  )( dzdtSdS σµ +⋅=  
when stock is paying dividends at a constant rate of y, 
 yrf −=µ , dtdz ε=  
using discrete time steps, 
])[(1 ttyrfSS nn δσεδδ +⋅−⋅= −  
hence, 
)])[(111 ttyrfSSSSS nnnnn δσεδδ +⋅−+=+= −−−  
3. Asset price in each time step can be set up as a above relationship. A software package 
such as Crystal Ball® can simulate these changes in asset prices repeatedly by generating 
random variable ε. 
4. For a European call option, we can calculate payout as )0,( XSMaxC NN −= , at the 
terminal asset value from each simulation. This value is discounted back to the present 
with the risk-free rate: TrfN eCC
⋅−⋅=0  
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5. After a number of trials, the mean of all the trial values of 0C  is approximate value of the 
call option price. 
The simulation values the European call option as $1,097,000, based on input variables from the 
example in Figure 3.1 and 4.9. The same option is valued at $1,092,000 based on the Black-
Scholes formula and it demonstrates that simulation generates a fairly accurate value. A major 
advantage of simulations is that they generate a distribution of an underlying assets and options 
value, instead of a single value, as shown in Figure 4.11. For example, it is possible to estimate 
that the possibility of getting the asset value above the costs is approximately 54%.  
 
 
Figure 4.11: Underlying Asset and European Call Value Distributions from Simulation 
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4.7. Application of Real Options Analysis to Large-Scale Real Estate Development    
Projects 
 
As illustrated in the chapter three, valuing flexibilities is crucial for multi-phase long term 
development projects due to the conventional DCF procedure’s tendency of systemically 
undervaluing later stage projects. A Decision Tree Analysis was previously used to address this 
problem but it had its own drawbacks. For instance, DTA becomes highly complicated even with 
a simplified assumption made in the example project in figure 4.5 – it only involved flexibilities 
of delaying the first phase up to three years and of abandoning the second phase at the third year 
if market turns unfavorable. The complex decision making flexibilities can be modeled as an 
option or a combination of several option. This approach would indeed value flexibilities more 
accurately if reliable data are available, and simplify the procedure of the analysis. For example, 
multi-stage projects can be valued as a sequential compound option.  
 
In this section, the example project analyzed in figure 3.6 and 4.5 is valued with the binomial tree 
approach. The example had a negative NPV of 621,000 based on the conventional DCF 
procedure. The same assumptions and inputs are used except that the flexibility of delaying the 
second phase is incorporated into the analysis. Following is the list of input variable values: 
PV(office)=$9,378,000; PV(office costs)=$8,367,000; PV(residential)=$17,029,000; 
PV(res. Cost)=$15,661,000; σoffice=20%; σresidential=25%; ρ=85%; office cap rate=8%; 
residential cap rate=7%; long term growth rate=2%; risk-free rate=5%. 
The permitting structure is that the development right grants the developer an option to build an 
office building as a first phase within three years, and committing to build the office grants her a 
right to develop a residential complex until six years from now. 
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The project can be valued as a compound expansion option. For the purpose of the simplification, 
the underlying asset here is defined as a portfolio of two assets, which are not separable due to a 
unique permitting structure. In this way, the present value of asset is $26,407,000 and the present 
value of costs is $24,028,000. The volatility of this portfolio is then estimated by calculating the 
variance of the portfolio: 
∑∑
= =
=
N
I
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1 1
 
with two assets, variance of the portfolio becomes 
212,121
2
2
2
2
2
1
2
1 2 σσρσσ wwwwVARP ++=  
where w1 = 9,378,000/26,407,000 = 0.36 and w2 = 1 –  w1 = 0.64, and then 
0505.025.02.085.064.036.0225.064.02.036.0 2222 =×××××+×+×=PVAR  
%5.220505.0)( === pp VARVolatility σ  
The portfolio income yield rate is assumed to be the weighted average of cap rates:  
 %4.774.07.064.08.036.0 ==×+×=y  
With these input variables in mind, the project is structured as an sequential compound option 
that has the first option (office) with the strike price of $8,367,000 and 3 years to maturity, and 
the option to move onto the second phase (residential) with the strike price of $15,661,000 and 6 
years to maturity. The valuation of this option works backward in a way that first option payoff is 
dependent on the second option payoff. The binomial tree provides a convenient tool for this type 
compound expansion option. First, the underlying asset price movement can be mapped out using 
the volatility calculated above. Second, the option payoff for the second phase can be derived 
from the asset tree. Thirdly, the first option payoff is derived from the previous option payoff as if 
the second option payoff is the asset tree for the first option. Figure 4.12 is the illustration of this 
procedure. The resulting implied value of the land is $4,155,000 which is worth $1,779,000 more 
than the value calculated from the conventional DCF procedure. Also, since the land can be 
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purchased at $3,000,000, it generates the positive NPV of $1,155,000. It is worth noting that the 
land value from the options approach is 75% higher than the value from the DCF approach just 
by accounting for the flexibilities of delay and abandonment. To be sure, the options value 
calculated here is only an approximate figure, and it depends entirely on the validity of the 
Figure 4.12: Multi-Phase Development Project as Sequential Compound Option 
 
S = 26407000
X1 = 8367000
X2 = 15661000 101,863,036
σ = 22.5% Second Phase Residential Tree 86,202,036
rf = 5.0% 81,339,286
y = 7.4% 65,678,286
q = 0.3971 64,950,739 64,950,739
u = 1.2523 49,289,739 49,289,739
d = 0.7985 51,864,219 51,864,219
T.Step = 1.0000 36,203,219 36,203,219
41,414,420 41,414,420 41,414,420
25,753,420 25,753,420 25,753,420
33,070,086 33,070,086 33,070,086
17,409,086 17,409,086 17,409,086
26,407,000 26,407,000 26,407,000 26,407,000
10,746,000 10,746,000 10,746,000 10,746,000
21,086,418 21,086,418 21,086,418
5,489,462 5,425,418 5,425,418
16,837,847 16,837,847 16,837,847
2,566,927 2,275,376 1,176,847
13,445,294 13,445,294
942,408 438,522
10,736,285 10,736,285
163,404 0
8,573,098
0
6,845,758
0
First Phase Office Tree
36,203,219
27,836,219
25,753,420 yes
17,386,420
17,409,086 yes 17,409,086
9,042,086 9,042,086
10,746,000 yes 10,746,000 yes
4,155,000 3,415,496
no 5,489,462 no 5,425,418
1,290,146 0
no 2,566,927 no
0
no 942,408
0
no
INPUT ASSUMPTIONS
 
*Shading indicates where an option is exercised.
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assumptions made. Furthermore, it is unlikely that we can reduce real world development projects 
into such a simple options structure. However, it can help investors to avoid mistakes of rejecting 
the project because the conventional NPV showed up negative and this analysis can be used in 
conjunction with other types of qualitative and quantitative analyses.  
 
4.8. Shortcomings of Real Options Analysis 
 
Real Options as illustrated with previous examples can be an effective tool to value flexibilities of 
real estate projects. However, the examples used here are highly stylized to simplify complex real 
world situations, and yet it involves input variables that are not easy to estimate. To use this tool 
in a practical manner, it is important to know what underlying assumptions of Real Options 
models are and how they are related to the real world projects. By acknowledging and 
understanding its shortcomings, mistakes of blindly accepting results from Real Options models 
can be avoided, and at the same time, investors can put outcomes of the analysis in a appropriate 
perspective. 
 
The major shortcomings of Real Options, when applied to real estate and other real assets, are 
originated from its most fundamental assumptions mentioned in the chapter 4.5. The first 
assumption is that the underlying asset price changes follow random walks, and their patterns can 
be modeled by stochastic processes. The most frequently used model is the Geometric Brownian 
Motion (GBM) and the most Real Options models are based on this assumption. The methods 
introduced in the chapter 4.6 – closed form formulas, Monte-Carlo simulation and binomial tree – 
are also based on the GBM model. However, whether real estate can be modeled with GBM is 
not evident. The GBM model works quite well for efficient markets such as the stock market but 
it is well known that the real estate market is not efficient and tends to be cyclical in nature. It is 
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possible to use other stochastic processes such as mean reverting processes19 described by Dixit 
and Pindyck (1994). However, the applicability of this model to real estate is not validated and 
the inefficiency in the real estate market would make testing difficult to do. More importantly, the 
typical procedures of using binomial tree, which is the most intuitive method for average 
practitioners, is based on approximation of the GBM model, and other more sophisticated models 
are challenging to implement within a binomial tree framework. In addition, the standard GBM 
model assumes a constant and known drift rate (required return of an asset) and volatility, and 
these assumptions might not hold true in real world situations. Therefore, to use Real Options as a 
quantitative tool, it is crucial to test the models against the real world market data. Academics 
have tried to perform empirical testing of Real Options models20, and in most cases, confirmed a 
range of options value in the real estate market. Nevertheless, the accuracy of the real options 
value has not been yet validated.  
 
The second fundamental assumption for Real Options valuation method is that there are no 
arbitrage opportunities and options payoff can be perfectly replicated by holding some portion of 
the underlying asset and borrowing (lending) at a risk-free rate. Then, the price for an option can 
be derived from the price and the volatility of the underlying asset. Use of risk neutral 
probabilities and risk-free rate as discount rate is applicable under this assumption. For financial 
options, this assumption holds fairly well since there are very well functioning markets for 
financial assets such as stocks and bonds. Thus, the accurate price for the underlying asset is 
readily observable and the volatility of the asset price can be easily estimated through the 
historical data. On the contrary, the typical underlying asset for Real Options, such as R&D 
project, does not trade in a market, and thus constructing replicating is not practically possible. 
                                                 
19 According to Dixit and Pindyck (1994), a simple mean-reverting process can be modeled as 
“ dzdtxxdx ση +−= )( ,” where η is speed of reversion and x is normal level of x . 
20 See Chapter 2 Literature Review for the information regarding the empirical studies conducted by 
academics. 
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Options on real estate are somewhere in the middle of these two cases in that there is a 
functioning market for real estate and yet the market is not as efficient. Moreover, each real 
property is unique and there is no guarantee that the properties to be developed on the land are 
identical or perfectly correlated with other properties currently observable in the market.21   
 
For typical real options, the problem of constructing a replicating portfolio is addressed in two 
ways. Arman and Kulatilaka (1999) suggested that the underlying asset of a real option can be 
replicated with a portfolio of traded investments. For instance, the replicating portfolio for the 
option to build a specific textile mill can be a portfolio of textile mill stocks. Also in real estate, 
an investment in a specific piece of vacant land can be replicated with a portfolio of public REITs. 
This approach would make constructing a replication portfolio of a real option efficient and 
practical. However, it suffers a huge conceptual flaw. That is, it is highly unlikely that financial 
instruments on similar business are perfectly correlated with a specific real asset. Therefore, this 
approach provides only a rough approximation of underlying asset value. Copeland and 
Antikarov (2001) proposed an alternative approach that uses the project value calculated with 
DCF method as the asset value. The volatility of the project is then estimated by performing a 
Monte Carlo simulation of project cash flows and their variability. This approach depends on the 
reliability of the original DCF valuation, and some degree of subjective inputs are required to 
estimate the volatility of the asset. The examples in the last chapter are based on the underlying 
asset value calculated from the conventional DCF procedure. This approach has a practical 
advantage because investors would use the conventional DCF method regardless, and thus it can 
present the Real Options valuation in a familiar context to most investors.  
 
                                                 
21 In the case of stock options, the underlying asset (shares of stock) is identical to any other share of the 
same company, so that the perfect correlation is guaranteed. Even in this case, it is worth noting that Real 
Options method uses parameters from the past data to estimate future movement pattern of the stock, and if 
there is a fundamental shift in the company’s business, the options valuation based on the past data can be 
misleading.   
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Even if we can construct a replication portfolio based on aforementioned methods, the “no 
arbitrage” principle should hold for conceptually realistic options valuation. To satisfy the 
condition of no arbitrage in theory, investors should be able to buy and sell any fractional shares 
of the underlying asset continuously or at least in a frequent interval and at little or no transaction 
costs. Most real assets would not satisfy this basic premise of no arbitrage and it is one the most 
critical conceptual difficulty that the Real Options method suffers. Brealey and Myers (2003) 
argues that we cannot rely on the arbitrage argument because of most real assets are not freely 
traded. In the context of real estate, since there is a functioning market, investors can hold a 
similar property to the one that is going to be developed. And thus, it is possible to construct an 
approximate replicating portfolio, although doing it in the real world would prohibitively costly. 
The point here is that, when valuing a piece of land as an option to build, it is important to 
acknowledge that the underlying property does not yet exist and a perfect replicating portfolio 
would not be possible due to the uniqueness of each property.  
 
Besides these conceptual difficulties, there are other obstacles for applying Real Option in a real 
world project. Lander and Pinches (1998) summarized the reasons for the limited used of Real 
Options in corporate decision-making as follows: 
• The types of models currently used are not well known or understood by 
corporate managers and practitioners. Also, corporate managers, practitioners, 
and even many academics do not have the required mathematical skills to use 
the models comfortably and knowledgeably.  
• Many of the required modeling assumptions are often and consistently violated 
in a practical real option application.  
• The necessary additional assumptions required for mathematical tractability 
limit the scope of applicability.  
 
Technically difficulties mentioned stems from the difficulty of construction a replicating 
portfolios and the shortcomings of approximating them. The major obstacle for practical 
implementation seems that the concept of Real Options is not well known and intuitively 
comprehensible for average investors. Mathematical concepts behind the options models are too 
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sophisticated to be used by most investors. Without the understanding of the underlying concepts, 
the existing Real Options models are “black boxes” for investors and it would not be possible for 
them to use these models in an analytical manner. On the other hand, the wide acceptance of the 
conventional NPV is partially due to its ease of use and manipulability. Even the binomial model, 
which is the most intuitive options model, requires the knowledge of the risk neutral dynamics 
and it is not something the majority of investors can understand intuitively.   
 
4.9. Comparison of Underlying Values in Decision Tree and Real Options 
 
Both Decision Tree and Real Options are useful tools for incorporating flexibilities into an 
investment analysis. In theory, if the structure of flexibility and the underlying assumptions are 
identical, both models should give same results. The major difference between two is that 
Decision Tree involves real probabilities – often subjectively determined – and risk adjusted 
discount rate and Real Options use risk-neutral probabilities – calculated based on risk-neutrality 
– and risk-free discount rate. Because of the similarity between two approaches, it is possible to 
get additional insights by comparing directly to each other.  
 
Consider an example of real estate development project based on figure 3.122. For the sake of 
simplicity, only one period is considered. Based on its 20% annual volatility, the up movement (u) 
of 1.2214 and the down movement (d) of 0.8187 is estimated.23 Assuming the asset price in the 
next year would be reduced by the income paid, the one year asset price movement can be 
approximated as in figure 4.13. Based on this price movement, we can think of flexibilities both 
in Decision Tree and Real Options frameworks. For both approaches, the flexibility here is either 
                                                 
22 The following input variables will be used as in Figure 3.1 except T and y: S = $9,378,000; X = 
$8,367,000; σ = 20%; T =1; rf =5%; y= 8%. 
23 teu δσ= , ued t /1== − δσ . 
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to build now or to build in the next year only if the market is favorable. Since the structure and 
the underlying assumptions here are identical, both approaches should produce a same result. 
 
Figure 4.14 illustrates the framework of Decision Tree based on the asset price movement shown 
in figure 4.13. Here, the expected payoff in each decision can be easily estimated. When the 
property value drops below the construction cost during the down market, the developer simply 
would not build and thus the payoff equals zero. During the up market, the developer can realize 
higher profit by waiting one year. As mentioned in the chapter 4.3, the problem with Decision 
Tree is that it is difficult to estimate the probabilities of outcome (p) and the appropriate risk 
adjusted discount rate (rc). Without knowing theses two values, it is not possible to know whether 
waiting creates higher value than building immediately. The value of immediate exercise – 
building now – is known and is $1,011,000. The value of waiting can be expressed as: 
)]0,()1()0,([ 110 XSMaxpXSMaxpeC du
rc −⋅−+−⋅⋅= −
 
Figure 4.14: Decision Tree Version of Development Option 
 
Figure 4.13: One Year Asset Price Movement 
 
t=0 t=1 t=0 t=1
$10,537,970 S1u=S0*u*(1-y)
$9,378,000 S0
$7,063,812 S1d=S0*d*(1-y)
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On the contrary, the Real Options approach effectively eliminates guesswork regarding 
probabilities and discount rates by using risk neutral dynamics. Once the risk-free rate is known, 
the call option value can be calculated in a straightforward way: 
)]0,()1()0,([ 110 XSMaxqXSMaxqeC du
rf −⋅−+−⋅⋅= −  
where, )/()( dudeq rf −−=  
Between two formulas, we can see only difference is the probabilities and the discount rate. The 
two equations should give an identical result since they are valuing exactly same situation. By 
making this comparison, it is possible to gain further insights on the real world probability and 
risk-adjusted discount rate. As shown in figure 4.15, the option value of the land is $1,192,576 
based on the binomial tree approach. The result from the decision tree should equal to this value. 
Now, since we already know the land value, there are only two unknown variables from the 
formulas from the decision tree. If the real probability (p) is known, it is possible to estimate the 
risk adjusted discount rate (rc), or vice versa. For example, assume the real probability of up 
market is 60%: 
 )]0,()1()0,([ 110 XSMaxpXSMaxpeC du
rc −⋅−+−⋅⋅= −  
0
11 )]0,()1()0,([ln
C
XSMaxpXSMaxpr duC
−⋅−+−⋅=  
    %8.8
576,192,1
)04.0970,170,26.0(ln =×+×=  
Figure 4.15: Real Options (Binomial Tree) Version of Development Option 
 
t=0 t=1 t=0 t=1
$2,170,970 C1u=Max(S1u-X,0)
57.7% q
$1,192,576 C0=EXP(-r )*(C1u*q+C1d*(1-q ))
42.3% 1-q
$0 C1d=Max(S1d-X,0)
q = (EXP(r )-d )/(u-d )
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This result shows that if the real probability of up market is 60%, the discount rate24 for the 
development project should be 8.8%.  
 
In the context of real estate development projects, although it is hard to know real probabilities, it 
is possible to reasonably estimate the development period risk-adjusted discount rates. The 
methodology introduced in the chapter 3 is also relevant for valuing development option. The 
development period return from the chapter 3.2 reflects similar risks as in the land development 
option.25 That is, they are both coming from the risks of achieving expected profit or payoff (S – 
X) when the land is developed. Therefore, the development required return formula can be 
restated as follows: 
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 where,  
S = current value of underlying asset,  ST = underlying asset value @ T year, 
X = current value of construction cost, XT = construction cost @ T year, 
rS = discount rate for underlying asset, rf = risk-free rate,   and 
T = time to construction completion. 
                                                 
24 This discount rate reflects risks of getting the payoff (S-X) a year later, and it should not be same as 
discount rate for the underlying asset. The discount rate for the land as an option should be higher because 
options are inherently riskier and they are equivalent to a levered position on underlying assets. 
25 See page 21~22. 
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The formula presented above can capture shifts in risks as the asset price changes in the future, 
and thus it is appropriate to use within the Decision Tree framework. For instance, as the asset 
price increases, the risk level would drop due to the lower leverage, and the formula incorporates 
this change in risks accordingly. Using this method, the discount rate for the payoffs in the 
decision tree in figure 4.14 can be calculated26: 
( )
%5.481
000,367,8000,378,9
05.1000,367,8115.1000,378,9
3/133
=−⎟⎟⎠
⎞
⎜⎜⎝
⎛
−
×−×=Cr  
Since the value of waiting is already known through the Real Options model, we can estimate the 
real probabilities of the up market: 
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−−−
−−⋅=  
     =−
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0970,170,2
0576,192,1 485.0e
89.3% 
Assuming the discount rate of 48.5% for the land option, the true probability of the up-market 
should be 89.3%.  
 
This process illustrates that it is possible to use the Decision Tree with less subjective input 
assumptions if investors can obtain information on either risk levels or real probabilities. More 
importantly, it can help investors avoid mistakes of using equal probabilities for all outcomes due 
to the lack of information. For instance, using 50% probabilities for the above example would 
undervalue the waiting option. Directly comparing Decision Tree and Real Options reveals the 
advantage of the Real Options approach more clearly. However, it is important to note that this 
advantage is only relevant where there is sufficient market information and the investment 
                                                 
26 Time to construction completion (T) is assumed to be 3 as in the example in the chapter 3. 
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uncertainty comes from the market. When the uncertainty of a project is not market driven, the 
decision tree analysis would be more appropriate because it shows effects and flows of decision 
making in an intuitive manner. In the real estate development industry, the market risk such as the 
volatility of property values can be modeled more efficiently with Real Options. Project specific 
risks such as permitting and environmental risks can be analyzed though Decision Tree and other 
management science techniques. 
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Ch. 5. Case Study Background: New Songdo City Project 
 
 
 
 
New Songdo City (NSC) is a massive public and private sector project based on the South Korean 
initiative to become an economic hub of the Northeast Asian region. The project also is the first-
ever US-South Korean real estate joint venture, and ranks as the largest international real estate 
investment in South Korea's history with the estimated cost US $ 12.7  billion over 12 years 
(Muto, 2004). 
 
The project involves a tremendous amount of risks especially due to the sheer size and 
complexities of the project. At the same time, it also presents a rare opportunity for the involved 
parties to create substantial profit as well as a brand-new world class city. I believe that the 
success of the project depends on the effective management and allocation of risks. Enormous 
amount of uncertainties related to the project requires the used of methods that incorporates 
flexibilities of future strategies, and this makes Decision Tree Analysis and Real Options 
Analysis all the more relevant.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is first to understand the structure and background of the project, and 
secondly, to identify risks involved in the project and determine which on of them are most 
crucial to maximize value of the project. The following preliminary analysis is mostly based on 
the information regarding the first phase of the project. 
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5.1. Project Background 
 
Shortly after the International Monetary Fund Bailout of South Korea in 1997, the City of 
Incheon and the Korean Central Government agreed to implement a long-term economic growth 
and development strategy for Korea which was based on turning Korea into a service and 
technology based global economy. Three major strategies were identified based on this initiative: 
a new international airport, a central place to house this new economy and substantial economic 
incentives to induce foreign investment to Korea. 
  
In March 2001, the $5 billion Incheon International Airport opened. It is the 2nd largest airport in 
the world and is capable of handling up to 50 million passengers annually. After the first year, the 
air traffic count stood at 27 million passengers with 240,000 flights. It is designed to handle up to 
50% of the world's air traffic flow by 2010. The Airport is connected to the mainland 5 miles 
away by an 8-lane bridge and commuter rail system to Seoul, which will be completed in 2005.  
 
In the late 1990's, the City of Incheon began reclaiming approximately 3,000 acres of land along 
the southwest edge of the Incheon City coastline in order to create a platform for a new, world-
class master planned community [See Figure 5.1]. This land would ultimately be developed by 
many international as well as domestic companies into a city of approximately 500,000 people 
and with services and amenities unlike any other city in the world. The goal of the city and the 
central government is to turn this land into “New Songdo City, the Hub of Northeast Asia". 
  
In early 2001, the City of Incheon granted POSCO E&C (a subsidiary company of POSCO, the 
2nd largest steel manufacturer in the world and one of the top companies in Korea) with a 6 
month developer designation to act as the lead Master Plan Developer for the first 1,500 acres of 
reclaimed land at New Songdo City. This designation was subject to POSCO obtaining a foreign 
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development partner with a majority interest in the venture. The purpose of that condition was to 
encourage foreign investment capital and user groups to New Songdo City, as well as to insure 
that this new city be designed and built above and beyond normal Korean standards. 
 
 
In April 2001, John Hynes and Stan Gale of The Gale Company in Boston traveled to Korea to 
meet with officials from POSCO and the Mayor of Incheon as well as to look at the real estate 
and begin to understand the dynamics of the marketplace. During this trip, The Gale Company 
found the following reasons to pursue this opportunity:  
• The Project had the full and complete support and endorsement of the City, Central 
Government and South Korean President Kim.  
• The land has all the necessary long-term fundamentals in place for real estate value: 
location, access to airport, access to public transportation, views, land that is easy to work 
with, utilities in place, streamlined approval process.  
• The Land could be bought at 25% to 50% of the potential future market value.  
• Phenomenal pent-up demand for housing and retail.  
• Great potential for International demand.  
Figure 5.1: New Songdo Reclamation 
 
Source: The Gale Company 
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• Blue-Chip Korean partner.  
• Fee ownership.  
• Government willing to create special Free Economic Zone designation for the area.  
 
In July 2001, The Gale Company, POSCO E&C and the City of Incheon executed the 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) granting the development right and the land supply 
agreement to the newly formed joint venture company, New Songdo City Development LLC, 
between Gale and POSCO. Recognizing the importance of closing the land in order to start some 
construction activity soon, the City and NSC identified 94 acres of land out of the 1,376 acre 
parcel as an immediate development priority. As such, the 5.5 million square foot Convention 
Center Complex, with an estimated total cost of approximately $1.3 billion, was approved by the 
City and is now in the design-development phase. 
  
The total cost of the 12-year build out is estimated to be approximately US $20 billion for 
roughly 100 million square feet of space and with $1 billion in land costs for the 1,000 net 
buildable acres. New Songdo City represents the single largest private development project ever. 
It is the largest land reclamation project outside of the Zuider Zee in the Netherlands. Through the 
70/30 partnership with Posco E&C, The Gale Company becomes the first legal foreign owner of 
Korean soil. 
 
5.2. Project Structure and Participants 
 
5.2.1. The Project Company and Sponsors 
Project Company 
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Although the selected project sponsors (The Gale Company and POSCO E&C) shared optimism 
regarding the project’s success, their main goal of the project structure, especially for The Gale 
Company, is to make sure to shield the sponsoring firms from any economic or legal downfalls. 
As shown in the figure 5.2, The Gale Company created several layers of special purpose project 
companies for this purpose. It is also important to note that the sponsors created two separate 
companies, one for the development operations and the other for the equity ownership of the 
project. This separation can in fact work well for this type of the project, since each company can 
take on different and separable roles and risks: Gale International LLC would be responsible for 
developing and operational aspects of the project, and New Songdo City Development LLC 
would be the holding company of assets generated. 
 
Managing Partner: The Gale Company 
The Gale Company (Gale) is a real estate investment, development and service company 
headquartered in Florham Park, New Jersey with a portfolio exceeding 50 million square feet of 
commercial property. Since its inception, Gale has invested over $3 billion on behalf of its 
investment partners. The Gale Company has developed strategic relationships with several 
leading institutions and corporations, such as Morgan Stanley, UBS/PaineWebber, J.P. Morgan, 
Credit Suisse First Boston, Blackstone Real Estate Advisors, and The Principal Financial Group. 
 
Besides the massive capital requirement, what the city of Incheon and POSCO E&C did not have 
was The Gale Company’s extensive list of institutional investors and clients. Clearly, for 
Koreans, Gale’s primary role in the project was attracting both foreign investors and tenants, so 
that the project becomes truly international in nature and thus would achieve the goal of an 
international economic hub.  
 
Local Joint Venture Partner: POSCO E&C 
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POSCO E&C is a subsidiary of POSCO, which is the world’s second largest steel producer. It is 
ranked 7th in terms of the construction revenue and also is the only Korean construction company 
that has a triple A credit rating from the local credit agency (Korea Rating, 2002). Larger 
construction companies, such as Hyundai Construction Company, went near bankrupt during the 
Figure 5.2: Project Company Structure 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: The Gale Company 
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late 90’s currency crisis, and were still struggling to get out of the excessive corporate debt they 
accumulated for years (Yahoo Finance Korea, 2004).  
 
POSCO E&C’s revenue in 2002 exceeded US $ 1 billion and its assets are valued around US $ 
962 million [see Figure 5.3]. For POSCO E&C, despite its decent size of balance sheet and sales 
revenue, it would not be possible for the company finance the entire project due to its sheer size. 
However, POSCO E&C jointly with POSCO Steel could contribute substantial amount of the 
equity capital, and thus play a role of managing partner. On the other hand, POSCO E&C’s 
specialty is engineering and construction and it has limited expertise in international marketing, 
finance, and management. Naturally, POSCO E&C’s major interest in the project would be 
construction contracts and the management fees.  
 
5.2.2. The Korean Government 
The New Songdo Project is a part of the government initiated plan to build three Free Economic 
Zones (FEZ) modeled after the success of those in Chinese cities such as Shanghai and Hong 
Kong’s. Big part of this plan is to encourage as much foreign direct investment as possible 
through the provision of a set of incentives, such as income tax exemption for foreign workers 
and better services tailed to accommodate foreigners (Korea Ministry of Finance and Economy, 
2004). Furthermore, the Korean government promises to deliver massive infrastructural facilities: 
Figure 5.3: Summary Income Statement and Balance Sheet of POSCO E&C 
 
 
Summary Income Statement (in US $1,000) Summary Balance Sheet (in US $1,000)
YEAR 1999 2000 2001 2002 YEAR 1999 2000 2001 2002
SALES $706,653 $487,021 $735,381 $1,185,488 TOTAL ASSETS $925,528 $852,663 $823,237 $961,885
COST OF SALES $613,497 $431,611 $638,501 $1,017,931 CURRENT ASSETS $594,988 $544,494 $479,069 $641,300
GROSS PROFIT $93,155 $55,410 $96,880 $167,557 NON-CURRENT ASSETS $330,540 $308,169 $344,168 $320,585
OPERATING INCOME $51,161 $19,052 $50,485 $101,249
ORDINARY INCOME $63,209 $25,482 $44,697 $61,741 TOTAL LIABILITIES $387,026 $339,843 $306,201 $384,043
NET INCOME $37,978 $15,162 $34,004 $48,907 CURRENT LIABILITIES $273,790 $266,651 $272,332 $350,441
NET INCOME TO SALES(%) 5.4% 3.1% 4.6% 4.1% LONG-TERM LIABILITIES $113,236 $73,192 $33,869 $33,602
SHAREHOLDERS' EQUITY $538,502 $512,821 $517,036 $577,841
COMMON STOCK $299,895 $272,684 $259,016 $124,958
RETAINED EARNINGS $238,607 $240,137 $258,020 $452,883
Source: www.poscoenc.com 
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It plans to develop the FEZ-designated Incheon International Airport next to the Songdo Project 
as the mega-logistics hub of Northeast Asia. Incheon International Airport will have a cargo 
terminal expansion, duty-free district, 24 hour operation system, and entry/exit facilitation. 
World-class express couriers and other logistics are holding talks with the Korean government to 
establish their Asian regional headquarters in Incheon International Airport area (Oh, 2003). 
Their goal of attracting foreigners is even more ambitious. According to Kab-Won Oh, Deputy 
Minister of Free Economic Zone, the Korean government will actively support the FEZ 
infrastructure construction and host regional headquarters of the world’s top 500 corporations.  
Five years from now, he assures, NSC will become the world’s premier cosmopolitan city where 
everyone all over the world would want to live. It will be the magnet, the Hub of all Northeast 
Asia. 
 
It is obvious that the success of New Songdo City depends heavily on whether the government 
can deliver its promises. NSC is the first one to be developed as FEZ, and the government has no 
previous track record of attracting foreign capital and companies to a single location in such a 
large scale. Specifically for NSC, the government committed to build a six-mile long, six-lane 
bridge connecting New Songdo City to the new Incheon International Airport, as well as roads 
making access easier to Seoul, 40 miles away (Sorohan, 2004). Without this infrastructure in 
place, any advantage that NSC might offer would be meaningless. 
 
5.2.3. Financial Advisors 
The most daunting task for the project sponsors is likely to be securing financing for the project. 
The cost for the first phase alone is estimated to be US $ 2.2 billions, and the entire cost for the 
1,500 acre site is over US $ 12 billions (Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority, 2004). After the 
Asian Financial Crisis, the Korean government opened up its financial market to foreign firms. 
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Since then, the foreign banks market share in Korea has been rapidly rising [see Figure 5.4], and 
they have accumulated substantial know how of doing business in Korea. With help of Morgan 
Stanley, who had a long-term relationship with Gale for its US investments, Gale and POSCO 
was successful in getting first round financing of US $ 90 million for the initial land purchase and 
working capital needs. Woori Bank, a Korean local bank, was selected as a lead arranger together 
with Morgan Stanley and ABN AMRO. Woori said the US$90 million, a syndicate loan, came 
from US$50 million split by Woori and the state-run Industrial Bank of Korea, and US$40 
million from Morgan Stanley, ABN Amro, the Bank of Nova Scotia and other investors. In 
addition to the first round financing, three banks – Woori, ABN AMRO, and Morgan Stanley –
completed an agreement to act as financial advisors for the future financing of the project (Lee, 
2004). Three advisors are currently planning to raise additional US $ 1 billion of construction 
financing for the first phase of the project (Woori Bank, 2004). 
 
5.2.4. Project Designer: Kohn Pederson Fox PC 
Kohn Pederson Fox (KPF) is New York based architecture and planning firm that specializes 
high end commercial buildings. KPF has designed high-rise towers and cultural centers in over 35 
countries. It also has successfully completed several projects in Korean, including Dongbu 
Figure 5.4: Top 10 Foreign Banks in Korea 
 
 
Source: The Korea Times, March 2004
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Kangnam tower and Rodin Museum. From the sponsor’s perspective, KPF is an ideal planner to 
achieve a higher standard living environment that NSC is set out to provide Korean people. 
 
5.3. Preliminary Analysis on Economics of Project 
 
To evaluate profitability and return of the project, we have analyzed the economics of the 
project’s first phase. One of the biggest incentives the Korean government provided to The Gale 
Company and POSCO was making the land available for substantially less than the prevailing 
market price of the region (The Gale Company, 2004). However, this incentive did not come free. 
In return, New Songdo City Development LLC (NSCD) had to build a new state-of-the-art 
convention center and assign it to the city of Incheon. Including the cost of the convention center, 
the total land acquisition cost would be still substantially less than the market value, and thus this 
structure would provide additional value to the sponsors when the project is completed and 
stabilized. In addition to the convention center, the first phase includes a new sixty story World 
Trade Center, high-rise residential towers, high-end retail spaces and hotels. Figure 5.5 shows the 
inventories of properties to be built for the first phase, with their costs and estimated benefits. 
 
Figure 5.5: Phase 1 Project Inventories 
 
Building Area Cost per Sq.Ft. Est. Const. Period Est. Sales Rev. Est. Ann. Income
(Sq. Ft.) (US $) (Quarters) (US $) (US $)
Block 36
Convention Center 300,000               92,048,000       5.1% 307                  12                          -                        -                        
World Trade Center
Office 648,000               112,072,000     6.2% 173                  16                          -                        19,463,000            
Residential 542,600               81,172,000       4.5% 150                  16                          154,871,000          -                        
Hotel 318,900               59,556,000       3.3% 187                  16                          -                        7,598,000              
Retail 500,700               68,406,000       3.8% 137                  -                        15,039,000            
Hotel 700,300               130,726,000     7.2% 187                  -                        17,729,000            
Parking Garage 1,850,000            107,516,000     5.9% 58                    -                        12,588,000            
Block 35
Residential 1,000,600            145,852,000     8.1% 146                  8                            246,755,000          -                        
Commercial 750,600               119,429,000     6.6% 159                  8                            -                        21,042,000            
Department Store 500,340               74,219,000       4.1% 148                  8                            -                        12,655,000            
Parking Garage 1,035,000            53,451,000       3.0% 52                    4                            -                        6,780,000              
Block 125
Residential Towers 3,972,000            637,898,000     35.2% 161                  8                            952,190,000          -                        
Parking 1,659,800            127,398,000     7.0% 77                    4                            -                        5,355,000              
Total $13,778,840 $1,809,743,000 100% $131 $1,353,816,000 $118,249,000
Est. Const. Cost*
(US $)
Source:  The Gale Company 
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It is important to note that the project involves two kinds of project. The first one is a collection 
of residential buildings to be sold as condominiums. According to the Gale Company’s feasibility 
study, for-sale properties would generate profit margins in the range of 22 to 39 percent in a 
relative short period [See Figure 5.6]. The other portion of the project involves income producing 
properties such as retail, hotel, office and parking garage. This kind of properties generate around 
9 to 14 percent annual income yield [See Figure 5.7]. This mix of properties gives the sponsors a 
flexibility that otherwise would be unavailable. For instance, it is possible to attract investors with 
short-term and long-term interest at the same time. More importantly, it could provide a financing 
flexibility using early cash flow as additional equity for the future development. We will discuss 
financing strategies using this early sales revenue in different ways in the later part of this paper. 
Figure 5.6: For-Sale Properties Costs and Profit Analysis 
 
Trade Center Residential
PROJECT RECAP/KEY ASSUMPTIONS Residential Towers Residential Totals
Block Designation 36 125 35
Total Building Area (Sq. Ft.) 542,600           3,971,489        1,000,600        5,514,689           
Total Number Of Residential Units 145 2200 890 3,235                  
Residential Unit Average Size (Sq.Ft.) 3742 1639 1124 6,505                  
PHASE 1 Land Value Allocation 9.9% 32.6% 7.4% 49.9%
DEVELOPMENT COSTS
Allocated Land Acqusition Costs $36,000,000 $119,000,000 $27,000,000 $182,000,000
Subtotal - Allocated Land & Pre-Development Costs $36,000,000 $119,000,000 $27,000,000 $182,000,000
Construction Costs per Sq. Ft. $129 $141 $129 $137
Construction Costs $69,890,584 $558,059,888 $128,884,111 756,834,583       
Design & Supervision Costs $4,500,000 $33,000,000 $6,200,000 43,700,000         
Construction Management Costs $2,096,718 $16,741,797 $3,866,523 22,705,038         
NSC Development Overhead Costs $3,522,098 $22,628,091 $5,188,654 31,338,843         
Marketing Fees/Costs $1,162,408 $7,468,017 $1,712,427 10,342,852         
Subtotal $81,171,808 $637,897,793 $145,851,715 864,921,316       
Financing Costs $3,753,540 $20,000,000 5292070 29,045,610         
Subtotal - Development Costs $84,925,348 $657,897,793 $151,143,785 893,966,926       
TOTAL COSTS $120,925,348 $776,897,793 $178,143,785 $1,075,966,926
Total Costs per Sq. Ft. $223 $196 $178 $195
SALE PROFITABILITY ANALYSIS
Sales Price per Sq.Ft. $293 $246 $253 $252
Gross Sales Revenues $158,842,237 $976,604,804 $253,081,528 $1,388,528,569
Sales Commissions/Closing Costs ($3,971,056) ($24,415,120) ($6,327,038) ($34,713,214)
Subtotal - Net Sales Proceeds $154,871,181 $952,189,684 $246,754,490 $1,353,815,355
Less: Project Development Costs ($120,925,348) ($776,897,793) ($178,143,786) ($1,075,966,927)
NET SALE PROFIT $33,945,834 $175,291,891 $68,610,704 $277,848,429
Sales Profit(Loss) per Sq. Ft. $62.56 $44.14 $68.57 $50.38
Net Profit Margin 28.1% 22.6% 38.5% 25.8%
* Convention center development costs/sales revenues are included in land cost allocated to other portions of Phase 1.  
 
Source: Author’s assumption based on information provided by The Gale Company 
   
 
 - 88 -  
Figure 5.7: Incom
e Properties C
osts and R
eturn A
nalysis 
    Source: Author’s assum
ption based on inform
ation provided by The G
ale C
om
pany 
 
   
 
 - 89 -  
 
When we looked at the project cash flow in its entirety, the project level IRR was 15.4 percent 
[See Figure 5.8]. It is a respectable return compare to the average 6 to 12 percent annual return of 
US real estate properties. However, 15.4 percent return in itself does not confirm the financial 
feasibility of the project. Considering risks of a first-of-a-kind project, estimating a required 
return is a challenge. This return figure in fact provides very little margin for error. Cost overruns 
and failure to achieve the target revenue would wipe out any potential profit and likely put the 
project into bankruptcy. In addition, the project involves risks outside of the project, such as 
political and macro economical risks of South Korea. Also, given the absence of comparables, the 
expected revenue is hardly reliable. The expected sales price of condominium is about 30 percent 
above newly constructed housing nearby and is about 50 percent less than the comparables in 
Seoul (CB Richard Ellis, 2003). The expected annual lease for the office is about 40 percent 
below the market lease of Seoul CBD area. Considering the high-end nature of the planned 
Figure 5.8: Pro-forma Project Level Annual Cash Flow 
 
(Figures in thousands of US dollars)
Year Total 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Land Purchase 268,000 268,000
Design and Construction Cost:
Block 36
Convention Center 92,048 4,602 7,364 18,410 24,853 23,012 13,807 0 0 0 0
World Trade Center:
Office 112,072 5,604 16,811 22,414 31,380 24,656 11,207 0 0 0 0
Residential 81,172 4,059 12,176 16,234 22,728 17,858 8,117 0 0 0 0
Hotel 59,556 2,978 8,933 11,911 16,676 13,102 5,956 0 0 0 0
Retail 68,406 1,026 1,710 2,052 20,522 34,203 8,893 0 0 0 0
Hotel 130,726 1,961 3,268 3,922 39,218 65,363 16,994 0 0 0 0
Parking Garage 107,516 7,526 32,255 43,006 13,977 1,075 9,676 0 0 0 0
Block 35
Residential 145,852 10,210 43,756 72,926 18,961 0 0 0 0 0 0
Commercial 119,429 8,360 35,829 59,715 15,526 0 0 0 0 0 0
Department Store 74,219 5,195 22,266 37,110 9,648 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking Garage 53,451 3,742 16,035 26,726 6,949 0 0 0 0 0 0
Block 125
Residential Towers 637,898 44,653 191,369 318,949 82,927 0 0 0 0 0 0
Parking 127,398 8,918 38,219 63,699 16,562 0 0 0 0 0 0
207,774
Total Cost 2,077,743 376,833 429,991 697,073 319,926 179,269 74,651 0 0 0 0
1.00 -0.012 -0.008 0.100 0.150 0.250 0.200 0.180 0.140
Residential Pre-Sales Revenue: 1.00 -0.02 0.30 0.32 0.40
Trade Center Residential 154,871 (1,858) (1,239) 15,487 23,231 38,718 30,974 27,877 21,682 0 0
Block 35 Residential 246,755 (4,935) 74,027 78,962 98,702 0 0 0 0 0 0
Block 125 Residential Towers 952,190 (19,044) 285,657 304,701 380,876 0 0 0 0 0 0
1,353,816
Net Annual Rental Income*: 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.51 0.83 1.06 1.08
Trade Center Office 19,463 357,524 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,926 16,199 20,654 289,676
Trade Center Hotel 7,598 118,599 0 0 0 0 0 0 3,875 6,324 8,063 92,112
Block 36 Retail 15,039 305,908 0 0 0 0 0 0 7,670 12,517 15,960 253,483
Block 36 Hotel 17,729 276,736 0 0 0 0 0 0 9,042 14,756 18,814 214,933
Block 36 Parking 12,588 257,448 0 0 0 0 6,420 10,477 13,358 13,626 12,588 187,353
Block 35 Commercial 21,042 471,833 0 0 0 0 10,731 17,514 22,330 22,777 21,042 354,663
Block 35 Department Store 12,655 283,768 0 0 0 0 6,454 10,533 13,430 13,698 12,655 213,300
Block 35 Parking 6,780 138,663 0 0 0 0 3,458 5,643 7,195 7,339 6,780 100,910
Block 125 Parking 5,355 109,520 0 0 0 0 2,731 4,457 5,683 5,796 5,355 79,701
Total Revenue 3,673,814 (25,837) 358,445 399,150 502,809 68,512 79,598 120,385 134,715 121,911 1,786,131
Net Cash Flow excl. Financing (402,670) (71,547) (297,924) 182,883 (110,757) 4,948 120,385 134,715 121,911 1,786,131
Unlevered Project IRR 15.44%  
 
Source: Author’s analysis based on information provided by The Gale Company
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properties, the figures look reasonable if not conservative. However, the bigger risk is whether 
the people would want to come and live in NSC at all. Therefore, focus should be given to the 
strategies for attracting future tenants and residents as well as minimizing risks in the project 
execution. 
 
5.4. Identification of Project Risks and Uncertainties 
 
5.4.1. Optimism 
Although New Songdo City project involves different interests and issues among different 
parties, one thing shared in common was optimism and ambition regarding the project’s success.  
The government firmly believes that the partnership with a foreign firm would warrant the 
success of the project. Mayor Ki-Sun Choi  of Incheon stated that (Business Wire, 2002) "We 
believe that this project will elevate the Republic of Korea as a leader of world trade and 
business. Together, government and the private sector hand in hand, we will make history and 
build one of the finest urban centers in the world." 
 
Despite the fact that the scope of NSC is many times his firm’s annual sales, Hak Bong Ko, 
president of POSCO E&C, believes that he can handle the entire construction within his company 
(Business Wire): "With our strong financial condition and solid reputation in the construction 
field, we are very confident that we can execute, manage and complete the whole project in an 
efficient and satisfactory manner. We are proud to be playing this important role in this 
tremendous development." 
 
John Hynes, president of the project comapny, goes even further to say that NSC will not only 
become "most audacious piece of real estate in the world" but also "the world's most 
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technologically advanced city." He claims that the city will have canals of Venice, street scenes 
out of Paris, a waterfront on Chicago, schools inspired by the preps schools of New England, and 
a health service designed by Harvard (Piore, 2004). 
 
Amongst all the optimisms, concrete strategies of how to achieve these ambitions seem still 
vague. I believe that the only way to get anywhere close to the ambitions laid out by NSC is to 
carefully align interests of different parties and effective allocate risks and benefits among 
involved parties. 
 
5.4.2. Political and Policy Risks 
The development plan for the Incheon free economic zone, which is the core strategy of the 
government to develop the area as the logistics hub in Northeast Asia, was introduced on 
October, 2003, during the national agenda meeting under the supervision of President Roh Moo-
hyun (Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority, 2003). It is one of the nation’s top priority 
projects and thus the Korean government would be the last one who would get in the way of 
building NSC. John Hynes’ perception of the Korean government further confirms the positive 
involvement of the government. He said that “What we found, which was unusual for a U.S firm, 
is not only New Songdo City a great piece of land, but the government is supporting us. Unlike 
the U.S., where you can run into barriers, here the Korean government is pulling us along 
(Sorohan, 2004).” 
 
For this project, the real problem arises from the government is that it may have promised too 
much. The related infrastructure projects alone are estimated to cost around US $ 7 billion [See 
Figure 5.9]. NSC’s success is entirely dependent upon whether the government can deliver its 
promises. For instance, the initial failure of Canary Wharf, similar real estate development project 
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in London, was largely due to the lack of transportation infrastructure (Poorvu and Segal, 2004). 
Also government’s plan to finance 90 percent of all the development cost from abroad draws lots 
of skeptics. One government official admits that “The financing plan is too vague. Unless the 
major portion of the required funds comes from the National Treasury, the success of the Incheon 
Free Economic Zone cannot be guaranteed.” 
 
One of the most critical mistakes the government and the sponsors of NSC made is that the 
government did not have a financial stake in the project itself. In fact, the toll bridge connecting 
between NSC and Incheon Airport is the only infrastructure project that secured a financing 
arrangement, and the government provided 50 percent of debt and equity under the structure of 
project finance.  
 
In this context, NSC needs to convince the government to make a considerable direct investment 
in the project. Failing to do so would make its goal of attracting foreign investors very difficult 
and foreign investors would demand higher interest or return for their investment due to the 
Figure 5.9: Incheon Free Economic Zone Metropolitan Infrastructure Plan 
 
The 2nd Airport Bridge (to be complete by 2008)  
Direct connection of Songdo to Incheon International Airport. 
Project cost: US$ 774.8 million (909.4 billion Korean Won) (10.25 km, 6 lanes) 
Developer: AMEC (UK) 
 
The 2nd Seoul Belt Expressway (to be complete by 2008) 
Initial opening between Songdo to Cheongna(21.5km) 
Project cost: US$ 639 million (750 billion Won)  
Developer: POSCO, E&C 
 
The GyungIn Express Bridge (to be complete by 2008)  
Direct connection of Songdo to southern part of Gyongki province. 
Project Cost: US$ 448.3 million (526.2 billion Won) 
Developer: The 3rd GyungIn Corporation. 
 
Gyongin Expressway extension line (to be complete by 2008)  
Direct connection of Cheongna to West Incheon IC. 
Project Cost: US$ 218.1 million (256.6 billion Won) 
 
Airport Railway (completed 38% of the 1st phase) 
Phase 1: Incheon International Airport to Gimpo airport(to be complete by 2005) 
Phase 2: Gimpo airport to Seoul Central Train Station. 
   
 
 - 93 -  
enormous perceived risks. Furthermore, it would make a long term fixed rate financing virtually 
impossible. On the other hand, the current government’s support does not warrant the same 
support from the next one. The next presidential election will be held in the year 2006, when the 
construction would be half way through. Koreans have had mixed responses toward foreign direct 
investment, and it is possible that a new government could change its direction completely. This 
change in the opposite direction is more likely to happen when the project goes bad, and 
government’s investment in the project would be an insurance against adverse impact of the 
sudden change in the government policy. 
 
5.4.3. Economic Risks 
International Finance Corporation (2004) lists currency risks and interest rate risks as the two 
most important economic risks. There are many tools available to manage these two risks, and 
thus the exposure to theses risks can be minimized. However, the bigger risk for NSC would be 
the future growth of the Korean Economy. The scenario of NSC and Free Economic Zone is 
based on the assumption that Korea can maintain its high growth rate of the past by switching to a 
knowledge based economy. If this assumption does not hold, the long term prospects of NSC 
would be dismal at best. 
 
Currency Risks 
According to the International Finance Corporation (2004), any type of foreign exchange fund 
would involve some degree of currency risks. Korea has a very active currency swap market 
(Bank of Korea, 2004), and thus it provides most convenient way of mitigating currency risks. 
Also the degree of the inherent currency risks in the project can be reduced by capitalizing on the 
fact that NSC is to primarily attract foreigners. Current financing scheme involves 50 percent of 
local currency debt and 50 percent of US $ nominated debt. If NSC can attract similar proportion 
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of local and foreign tenants and residents, NSC can receive the Korean currency revenue from 
locals and US $ revenue from foreigners. This is more feasible based on the government’s plan to 
use all of US $, Euro, and Korean Won as a common currency. The Korean Won revenue will be 
used to service local debt, and US $ revenue to service foreign debt. In this way, NSC can 
effectively minimize currency risks without entering costly currency swap contract. 
 
Interest Rate Risk 
Interest Rate Risk is more problematic for the project than currency risk due to the difficulty of 
getting fixed-rate, long-term loans for high risk projects. According to the IFC (1999), floating 
interest rates are the norm rather than the exception for project financed loans. The best way to 
mitigate interest rate risks is to negotiate a fixed interest rate. Considering high risks of the 
project, it is entering long-term fixed rate contract is unlikely. In this case, NSC has an option of 
entering an interest rate swap contract. Although the Korean derivative market has been gaining 
liquidity in the recent years, fixed rate interest swap is only available up to three years and long-
term contract is rarely available (AsiaRisk, 2004). Despite the current low rate environment, I 
believe that managing interest risk is important due to the size of future construction loan. For the 
loans from the foreign banks, NSC can use the international or the US capital market for interest 
rate swaps. And for the local loans, NSC can still enter short term local interest rate swap 
contract. In addition, NSC can rapidly amortize outstanding loans using early cash flows 
generated by for-sale properties, and thus reducing the interest rate exposure and the hedging cost 
over time. 
 
5.4.4. Construction Risks 
The current plan for NSC is that POSCO E&C will be construction manager overseeing all the 
construction process of the project. Although POSCO is a very highly rated local company with 
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revenues of $1.1 billions in 2002, assigning 
all the risk to a company is a questionable 
strategy and warrants further investigation. 
POSCO may have the financial capacity to 
bear some of the construction risk for the 
general buildings, but not for the whole 
project. Further diversification of the 
construction risk may be necessary. It is 
important to note that the project involves 
multiple properties with different risk levels. 
For instance, the 60 story world trade center and convention center would involve much higher 
risk of cost overruns and delays than apartment buildings and parking garages. In this sense, it is 
possible to categorize risk levels and apply corresponding risk management strategies. 
 
First, I believe that the first step for a risk mitigation was aligning participant’s interests with 
appropriate risks so that there would be little agency conflicts. In this sense, the current scheme 
calls for a considerable revision. The using investment partner as a construction manager and 
contractor can be a proper strategy since any mistakes during the construction period would hurt 
itself as a equity investor in the project. However, POSCO’s current stake in the project company 
is under US $ 10 million (Sorohan, 2004), and this is minuscule amount compare to the size of 
the construction contract. Therefore, the potential profit from the construction contract can 
compensate for any loss in its investment interest. To minimize the potential conflict of interests, 
I recommend NSC to require substantial additional equity investment from POSCO. 
 
Secondly, even if it is POSCO’s intention to achieve the highest quality of construction possible 
within the budget and the schedule, too much construction risk is in POSCO’s hand, and it calls 
Figure 5.10: World Trade and Convention 
Center Complex 
 
Source: The Gale Company 
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for some degree of diversification. For two most challenging properties – World Trade Center 
and convention center [See Figure 5.10] –, POSCO should be the lead contractor since it has most 
incentives to perform. Furthermore, we recommend bringing in high-profile contractors with 
convention center experience from abroad and forming a joint venture with POSCO. It will 
produce synergies of combining the foreign firm’s state of the art construction technologies and 
POSCO’s local knowledge and conventions. The remaining part of the projects such as the retail 
and residential buildings are relatively less risky. Therefore, NSC would enjoy the cost saving 
benefits of competitive bidding process among respected Korean construction companies. 
Independent supervisors play important role for the quality assurance. When using multiple 
contractors as suggested, the role of the supervisor is even more critical. In my opinion, NSC 
must hire a renowned foreign engineering firm as a supervisor to achieve the level of quality it 
aims to provide. 
 
5.4.5. Market Risks 
Among many risks presented here, the market risks are the hardest to estimate and mitigate, 
simply because the project is a city built up from a scratch. However, NSC is in fact only a small 
part of the entire Songdo redevelopment [see Figure 5.11], and the local housing development has 
already started a couple of years ahead. The Korean housing market has had rapid growth 
throughout the history of modern Korea, and it has been major source of the wealth creation for 
Koreans. The problem of the Korean housing market has been the fact it has been too good an 
investment. The rate of the growth in housing prices far exceeded the growth of the per capita 
income and housing affordability has been major social issues (Oh, 2003). Due to the rapid rise of 
housing prices, rental housing market has never taken off the ground, and Koreans thinks that 
rental housing is for the poor. Besides rare incidents, for-sale housing development has provided 
tremendous profit opportunities. Local housing development nearby NSC already signals a huge 
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success of the project. According to Money Plus, all 5,000 housing units planned for the parcel 
next to NSC has been pre-sold, and these units are now being traded at 50 percent premium above 
the original sales prices. Local brokers cite the proximity to the NSC development site as a major 
reason for its success (Money Plus, 2004). 
 
In contrast to housing markets, the success of office, hotel, and other commercial spaces are still 
very much unknown. Government officials are hoping that in contrast to Seoul, where most 
foreign branch offices are located, NSC will attract Asian Headquarter offices. However, the city 
Figure 5.11: Development Map of New Songdo City 
* Heavy line represents the boundary of New Songdo City (NSC) project 
 
 
Source: Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority
   
 
 - 98 -  
of Seoul already provided plenty of high-end office spaces for such tenants. Also, whether NSC 
can compete with the proven financial centers like Hong Kong is still up in the air. 
 
I believe that NSC can use these two contrasting market segments to their advantage to mitigate 
the market risks. First of all, when the housing market is good, NSC should pre-sell as much 
housing units possible, and thus minimize risk of market softening. For the office portion, NSC 
should find a brand-name tenants and offer them with long-term leasing contract and at the same 
time attract them as equity investors. When the first couple of large companies jump in, often 
times, others follow. 
 
It is clear that the market risk is the most critical factor for the success. Obviously, there is no 
sure way of taking this risk away. However, through a strategic investment partnership, coupled 
with the perfect execution of the project, this uncertainty in the market demand will go away in 
the future. 
 
5.4.6. Financing Risks 
Considering enormous capital requirements for the NSC project, there would be a huge risk 
regarding the financing of the project. Korean commercial banks have a limited ability to provide 
true long-term financing for real estate projects. Bank loans in Korea rarely exceed three to five 
years, including the construction period, whereas the Songdo development project requires at 
least fifteen years of amortization after the construction. As a result, the project sponsors would 
have to refinance after a couple of years with new loans, private placements or public bond issues 
with longer tenors. Through this "two-step" financing process, the sponsors would expose 
themselves to significant refinancing risks and unfavorable interest rate fluctuations (defined 
under financial risks) which may reduce the return on investment or even fail the overall project. 
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In the short term, the pre-sales mechanism of the Korean housing market provides greater 
flexibility in short term financing that otherwise would have been impossible. Figure 5.12 shows 
a typical condominium installment plan that was used for one of the residential complex near 
NSC. This early cash flow will enable the sponsors pay down construction loans quickly. More 
importantly, by reinvesting profits from the early stage housing sales, the sponsors can build up 
their equity in the project. By applying this strategy of early housing presales and sales proceeds 
reinvestment, the sponsors would require less than US $ 1 billion of construction, when total 
construction budget of the first phase was approximately US $ 2.2 billion. More interestingly, this 
would generate enough equity in the later phase income producing properties to support a 
permanent debt service coverage ratio of 1.6. This would in fact translate into around 50% of 
interest savings. Furthermore, banks would be more comfortable lending to the project, because 
of the diminishing default risk on the loan as the project progresses. 
 
 
 
The permanent loan financing will be harder to do in Korea because of limited long-term 
financing sources. For instance, the average maturity of the Korean corporate bond is somewhere 
Figure 5.12: Typical Condominium Payment Schedule 
 
# 0f Per SF Per Unit Down
Unit Type Floor Level Units Sales $ Sales $ Payment 2004.4 2004.8 2004.12 2005.4 2005.8 2005.12 Final Pmt
32A Ground Fl. 10 $133 $159,348 $15,934 $15,934 $15,934 $15,934 $15,934 $15,934 $15,934 $47,808
(1200 SF) Middle Fl. 80 138 165,181 16,518 16,518 16,518 16,518 16,518 16,518 16,518 49,558
Top Fl. 10 160 191,848 19,184 19,184 19,184 19,184 19,184 19,184 19,184 57,558
32B Ground Fl. 12 135 162,103 16,210 16,210 16,210 16,210 16,210 16,210 16,210 48,633
(1200 SF) Middle Fl. 186 141 168,770 16,877 16,877 16,877 16,877 16,877 16,877 16,877 50,633
Top Fl. 12 163 195,770 19,577 19,577 19,577 19,577 19,577 19,577 19,577 58,733
40 Ground Fl. 4 168 234,501 23,450 23,450 23,450 23,450 23,450 23,450 23,450 70,351
(1400 SF) Middle Fl. 70 176 245,751 24,575 24,575 24,575 24,575 24,575 24,575 24,575 73,726
Top Fl. 4 201 281,168 28,117 28,117 28,117 28,117 28,117 28,117 28,117 84,351
46 Ground Fl. 8 173 277,060 27,706 27,706 27,706 27,706 27,706 27,706 27,706 83,119
(1600 SF) Middle Fl. 137 181 289,143 28,914 28,914 28,914 28,914 28,914 28,914 28,914 86,744
Top Fl. 8 203 325,393 32,539 32,539 32,539 32,539 32,539 32,539 32,539 97,619
55 Ground Fl. 4 175 349,963 34,996 34,996 34,996 34,996 34,996 34,996 34,996 104,992
(2000 SF) Middle Fl. 72 183 365,379 36,538 36,538 36,538 36,538 36,538 36,538 36,538 109,617
Top Fl. 4 201 402,463 40,246 40,246 40,246 40,246 40,246 40,246 40,246 120,742
67 Ground Fl. 2 177 425,617 42,562 42,562 42,562 42,562 42,562 42,562 42,562 127,685
(2400 SF) Middle Fl. 36 186 445,200 44,520 44,520 44,520 44,520 44,520 44,520 44,520 133,560
Top Fl. 2 202 483,950 48,395 48,395 48,395 48,395 48,395 48,395 48,395 145,185
Installment Payment
 
Source: www.land4949.co.kr 
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around 3.5 years, and also there are no long term domestic commercial mortgages available in 
Korea. On the equity side, the sponsors might not have accumulated enough equity to support 
long-term financing and it is also possible that existing equity holders would want to realize their 
return by taking their equity out of the project. When such events happen, there would be 
substantial amount of new equity to be raised by the sponsors or they have to disposed all the 
assets and liquidate. 
 
As a tool for a long term financing, the development of ABS market in Korea offers a unique 
opportunity. The asset-backed securitization market in Korea has been a haven for many projects 
struggling to borrow the kind of amounts that had previously made available through government 
loans or straight bond markets. In the wake of the Asian financial crisis, investors became 
comfortable with securitization issues, because deals carry extra credit enhancement and typically 
expose investors to only one asset (Giddy, 2000). 
 
 
 
Figure 5.13: Short and Long-Term Financing Analyses for First Phase 
 
(Figures in thousands of US dollars)
Year Total 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Development Expenditure 2,077,743 376,833 429,991 697,073 319,926 179,269 74,651 0 0 0 0
Net Pre-Sales Revenue (25,837) 358,445 399,150 502,809 38,718 30,974 27,877 21,682 0 0
Net Rental Revenue 0 0 0 0 29,794 48,624 92,509 113,033 121,911 1,786,131
Construction Loan:
Beginning Balance 0 392,670 449,557 647,941 573,654 769,706 885,753 0 0 0
Advances 392,670 21,547 157,924 0 144,423 46,774 0 0 0 0
Interest 334,735 0 35,340 40,460 58,315 51,629 69,274 79,718 0 0 0
Repayment 0 0 0 (132,602) 0 0 (965,471) 0 0 0
Ending Balance 392,670 449,557 647,941 573,654 769,706 885,753 0 0 0 0
Permanent Loan: 8%
Beginning Balance 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 965,471 955,816 946,258
Advances 0 0 0 0 0 0 965,471 0 0 0
Interest 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 67,583 66,907 66,238
Repayment 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 (77,238) (76,465) (75,701)
Ending Balance 0 0 0 0 0 0 965,471 955,816 946,258 936,796
DSCR @ Stabilization 1.59    X
Equity:
Equity Investments 200,000 10,000 50,000 140,000
Sales Revenue Reinvestment 0 358,445 399,150 452,528 34,846 27,877 0 0 0 0
Cash Distribution to Equity 0 0 50,281 33,666 51,722 120,385 134,715 121,911 1,786,131
Net Cash Flow to Equity (10,000) (50,000) (140,000) 50,281 33,666 51,722 120,385 134,715 121,911 849,335
Equity IRR after Financing 39.46%
 
Source: Author’s analysis based on information provided by The Gale Company
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5.5. Basis of Further Analysis 
 
As evidenced by the analyses in this chapter, NSC is an enormously complex project that 
involves a great deal of uncertainties from every direction of the project. It would simply be 
impossible to capture this complexity with a single model. However, the qualitative analyses in 
this chapter reveal that a large portion of the risks can be mitigated by better strategies and their 
implementations. The lesson from the tools introduced in the chapter 4 tells us that as 
uncertainties and resulting risks goes up, the potential value of flexibilities become higher. 
Therefore, it is essential to incorporate Decision Tree and Real Options analyses into the analysis 
of the New Songdo City project. 
 
Due to its sheer complexity, the application of DTA and ROA would be a daunting task. DTA 
would quickly become “decision bushes,” and there would be too many variables and resulting 
options to be modeled with a conventional Real Options model. In this sense, both tools could not 
be used to value the project precisely in a practical manner. However, these models’ capabilities 
of valuing flexibilities would still have critical use for the investors and other related parties. 
 
From the risks identified in the chapter 5.4, the market risk is a single most important risk that 
cannot be effectively controlled by the investors. Also other risks are correlated with the market 
risk in that if market turns out to be a good one, other related risks would decrease as well. 
Therefore, the following analyses would focus on the uncertainties of the market, which is 
interpreted as the volatilities in underlying asset prices. One of the most important procedures 
required for DTA and ROA is the simplification of the real world situations through the 
identification of critical uncertainties. The analyses in the chapter 6 reveal that the flexible 
strategies in response to the change in market conditions are the important value driver in the 
New Songdo City project.  
 - 102 - 
Ch. 6. Case Study: Valuing Flexibilities in the development of 
New Songdo City  
 
 
As identified in the chapter 5, New Songdo City involves a number of risks and the success of the 
project depends on the developer’s strategies to deal with them. The methods presented in the 
chapter 4 illustrate that the value of the project is enhanced when there is flexible strategies 
available to developers. Especially, when the project involves a large amount of uncertainties, the 
value of flexibilities increases from the options perspective. Thus, it is evident that incorporating 
the value of flexibilities into the analysis is crucial, and the project is likely to be undervalued 
without doing so. In this chapter, the NSC project is first valued with the conventional 
Discounted Cash Flow method, and later the analysis is complemented with the Real Options and 
Decision Tree approaches. 
 
6.1. Valuation of New Songdo City with the Discounted Cash Flow method 
 
Although it leaves out the value of flexibility, the Discounted Cash Flow analysis is a correct 
method to value investments assuming there is no flexibility. Both Real Options and Decision 
Tree are based on the values calculated with the DCF procedures, and thus it is critical to 
thoroughly apply this method as a basis of the further analysis. In this section, each property type 
in the project is analyzed first, to identify necessary input assumptions that are required for the 
DCF procedure. Based on the assumptions identified, the property and the aggregate level DCF 
analyses will be performed. The project involves largely 10 property types as summarized in 
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figure 6.1. Majority of properties are programmed for either housing (45.7%) or office (39.7%) 
and the focus is given to the analysis of these two properties.27 Hospitals, schools, government 
buildings and other service related properties are assumed to be developed as fee based projects 
with clients’ full commitment, and thus only nominal amounts of risks are involved. These 
properties are assumed to be zero or slightly negative NPV projects on this ground.28   
Figure 6.1: Summary of Project Inventories (in SF)
PHASE HOUSING OFFICE RETAIL HOTEL HOSPITAL SCHOOL GOV. TOTAL FAR
PHASE 1 5,515,220 648,000 1,751,640 1,019,200 0 0 1,000,000 9,934,060 2.8
PHASE 2 10,915,664 1,931,000 1,166,955 656,973 1,849,138 279,513 0 16,799,243 1.7
PHASE 3 5,650,451 0 340,000 0 0 0 0 5,990,451 0.4
PHASE 4 15,090,462 9,998,775 2,342,386 0 0 279,513 0 27,711,137 2.4
PHASE 5 5,289,300 13,711,970 2,004,071 0 0 0 0 21,005,341 4.7
PHASE 6 246,000 10,834,234 919,630 0 0 0 0 11,999,865 1.8
TOTAL 42,707,097 37,123,979 8,524,682 1,676,173 1,849,138 559,026 1,000,000 93,440,096 1.9
% of TOTAL 45.7% 39.7% 9.1% 1.8% 2.0% 0.6% 1.1% 100.0%  
6.1.1. Residential Properties 
In the chapter 5, residential properties are identified as the most promising component of the 
project. The high-end condominiums recently constructed nearby the NSC site have been sold out 
and the reason for their success is said to be due to the proximity to NSC. The housing market in 
Korea is dominated by for-sale high-rise condominiums, and the current plan for NSC is to take 
advantage of this situation. The housing rental market in Korea is largely marginalized and it is 
common conception that rentals are for the poor. The for-sales housing market has been a major 
source of wealth in Korea, and residential properties are the only asset class that has had 
consistent growth over the last ten years. The Korean stock market, in contrast, did not have 
much real growth despite its high volatility, and the underperformance of other asset classes has 
been another important reason for the success of for-sales condominiums as investments. Figure 
6.2 compares Korean Stock Price Index (KOSPI) and housing sales index publicized by Kookmin 
Bank. It shows that the Korean stock prices did not exhibit a long-term growth and yet the 
                                                          
27 See Appendix A for the detailed breakdown of programs in each phase. 
28 Also, they only account for 3.7% of the building area to be developed. As an overall plan, it is important 
to have these programs in place; however the profit of the individual building would not affect much on the 
overall return of the project. 
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housing prices have had a fairly consistent growth. Especially since the year 2001, the average 
growth rate of for-sale housing was an impressive 18%. 
  
Another unique aspect of Korean rental housing market is “Chonsei” system that has been the 
standard way of earning rental incomes.29 Chonsei is a full lump sum deposit paid in advance to 
the lessor and is returnable at the end of the lease period without interest. Typical term for 
Chonsei is two years and the owner is supposed to earn interests on the deposit. In a way, it is 
similar to zero-coupon bonds. This practice is originated from the high interest environment in 
the past, when the typical consumer interest rate was above high teens. Also it was a form of 
consumer financing when the concept of personal and household credit did not exist. The deposit 
amount in the Chonsei system is ranges between 30% and 70%, and the rate is highly correlated 
with the change in the asset prices [see Figure 6.3]. In today’s low interest environment, this 
system becomes problematic because the implied interest (rent) on the deposit is only about 
                                                          
29 Monthly rentals are typically only available to low income households and foreigners. They accounts for 
last than 5% of the housing maket. 
Figure 6.2: Korean Stock and Housing Market (1993-2003) 
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Source: The Bank of Korea, Kookmin Bank
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5~6%. Since the Chonsei deposit is average 50% of the property value, the yield on the asset 
becomes only about 2.5~3%.30  However, the high growth in sales prices has more than 
compensated the lower income in the recent years. 
 
Based on the sales trend in the nearby area, US$ 280 per square foot can be easily achievable for 
the residential properties in NSC. Considering higher standard of design and construction, it 
might be possible to sell housing units up to US$ 350 per square foot. As shown in Figure 6.3, the 
recent 10 year growth rate of for-sales properties is 7.3% per annum and for the past three years, 
the growth rate has accelerated to 18% per annum.  
6.1.2. Office Properties 
Unlike residential properties, it is challenging to estimate future values of office properties in 
NSC, due to the absence of comparables. City of Incheon does not have a central business district 
equivalent to the one to be created in NSC, and there is no current demand for such a large 
amount of class A office spaces in the area. The central business district of Seoul currently has 67 
                                                          
30 Most people invest the Chonsei deposits in quite risky investments and aims to get above 10% returns on 
them. However, the risk free rate should be used to calculate the yield because the income should be cash 
equivalent. 
Figure 6.3: Residential Sales Price and Chonsei Deposit Index (1993-2003) 
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million square feet of Class A and B office spaces, and yet NSC promises to deliver 37 million 
square feet of new office spaces.31 In this sense, the success of the office properties entirely 
depends on the promises of the Free Economic Zone. 
 
In the absence of direct comparables, the office market in Seoul is used as a basis of the analysis 
and fairly conservative assumptions are used. Seoul office market has had extremely low 
vacancies compared to other major cities in the world, and proves that there is healthy demands 
for high-quality office spaces [See Figure 6.4]. Good news for NSC is that office construction in 
Seoul has been tapering down since the mid nineties and there is few undeveloped lands left in its 
business districts (Vigers Korea, 2002). When there is necessary transportation infrastructure in 
place, a big portion of future demand can shift to NSC. The developer and the government are 
aware of this problem of uncertain demand and they planned the construction of office properties 
for later phases. 
 
Unlike the housing market, the growth in value for office properties has been in line with overall 
rate of inflation. As shown in figure 6.5, both sales price and rents has been rising moderately at 3 
                                                          
31 City of Incheon currently has about 10 million square feet of mostly class B and C office spaces. 
Figure 6.4: Office Vacancy Rates, Seoul (1993-2003) 
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to 5% per annum except during the period of the Asian financial crisis. The recent ten year 
average growth rate is 3.8% where the average CPI growth for the same period is 4.0%. 
According to Cushman & Wakefield (2004), the average net office rent in the central business 
district of Seoul is US$ 45 per square feet, and the average cap rate for the core office properties 
is about 9%. For the analysis of the office properties in NSC, the net office rent of US$30 per 
square feet is used, which is 33% below the current market rate in Seoul. The same cap rate and 
growth rate is assumed. However, three years of abortion period is used to partially account for 
the risks related to the uncertain demand. 
 
6.1.3. Retail Properties 
Considering the huge amount of new residential and office properties to be introduced, the retail 
component of the project that accounts for 9.1% of total area can be supported internally. Also, 
the nearby city of Incheon has over 2,000,000 residents and 8,000,000 households and yet the 
area currently does not enjoy diverse retail environment available to the other Seoul metropolitan 
areas. The retail element of the project consists of large regional malls and street retails. The 
demand for this retail would initially come from the city of Incheon itself, as there are little or no 
Figure 6.5: Office Sales Price and Rent Index, Seoul (1993-2003) 
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modern retail facilities. Modern retail facilities represented by department store has enjoyed more 
than 20% annual sales growth for the past decade, and other types of modern retails recently 
introduced, such as American style malls and discount store, are starting to expand rapidly 
(Vigers Korea, 2002). The growth rate of retail has been highly correlated with the growth in the 
Gross Domestic Product of Korea, and the analysis incorporates it as a base growth rate for the 
retail component. Accounting for both Chonsei deposits and monthly rents, the retail component 
is expected to generate the annual income of 12%, which is in line with other modern retail 
properties in the Seoul metropolitan area. 
6.1.4. Luxury Hotels 
Hotels are planned for the second phases of the project, and it is an important to component of 
making the city as a world class business center. However, hotel demand would not pick up until 
the majority of office spaces are occupied and it would only happen in the later phase. For 
strategic reasons, however, it is important for developers to have them in place early on. 
Therefore, the analysis assumes that it would take 6 years until the hotel occupancy would reach a 
normal rate. The average daily rate of US$120 is used for the purpose of analysis. 
6.1.5. Land Deal and Overall Project Schedule 
One of the greatest merits of the project is the fact that the government is providing land in a low 
fixed price which is estimated to be much lower than the market values of the land in the region. 
Also as the project turn out to be a success, the land parcels would command much higher prices 
than ones nearby. Therefore, this land deal has enormous potential for the future value creation. 
The for the first three phases, the government agrees to provide land for US $700,000 per acre, 
which the government estimates as 25% of the fair market value, For the later phases, the 
remaining land can be bought for US $2,000,000 per acre. 
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The government and the Gale Company have a very aggressive schedule laid out for the 
construction of the project. They planned to commence the construction of each phase 
approximately one year apart, and in the year 2007, five phases will be fully committed, if things 
progress as planned. The schedule for the last phase is not yet determined, and is entirely optional 
as long as the previous five phases are started. Figure 6.6 illustrates the plans for construction 
phasing and durations.  
 
6.1.6. Discount Rate and other Assumptions 
In addition to the previous analysis of each property type, it is crucial to determine discount rate 
for each stream of future cash flows. The construction costs are assumed to be fixed and are 
discounted with risk free rate. Korea has an active government bond market, and it gives 
guidance as to the determination of appropriate risk free rate. Figure 6.7 shows the trend in the 
Korean government bond rates during the past decade. It has steady downward trend and the 
currently rates are in fact lowest in the history. The current rate of 5.5% for the longest term, 10 
year government bond is selected as the risk free rate, since it matches quite well the duration of 
the project. 
Figure 6.6: New Songdo City Construction Schedule 
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Source: New Songdo City Development LLC.
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For the overall growth rate, two sources are used for the base growth rates [see Figure 6.8 for 
recent trends]. The construction and other fixed costs are assumed to grow at the average 4.0% 
CPI growth rate of the past decade. Some other growth rates, such as retail sales and hotel rates 
are highly correlated with GDP and for them the average growth rate of 5.1% is applied. 
 
The discount rates for each property and other costs are determined based on the information 
analyzed in the previous chapter. In addition to the property level discount rate, a premium of 2% 
is incorporated to reflect the speculative nature of the project. Figure 6.9 summarizes input 
Figure 6.8: Annual Changes in GDP and CPI (1993-2003) 
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Figure 6.7: 3-Year Korean Government T-Bill Rates (1994-2003) 
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assumptions to be used for the basis of the DCF analysis: 
 
6.1.7. NPV analyses based on DCF valuation 
A pro-forma cash flow analysis based on the findings in the previous chapters is developed for 
each property type in each phase.32 Figure 6.10 is the summary of results from the DCF valuation 
of the pro-forma cash flows: 
 
                                                          
32 See Appendix B for the detailed pro-forma DCF analysis. 
Figure 6.10: Summary of NPV analysis based on DCF method (in thousand US $) 
 
PHASE 1 PHASE 2 PHASE 3 PHASE 4 PHASE 5 PHASE 6 TOTAL
Residential
PV of Benefit 1,056,562    2,303,109    965,087       2,353,499    753,248       31,989         7,463,495    
PV of Costs 769,435       1,648,993    833,368       2,172,905    743,569       33,763         6,202,033    
Benefit - Costs 287,128       654,116       131,719       180,594       9,679           (1,774)          1,261,461    
Office
PV of Benefit 114,625       320,937       -                   1,681,438    1,454,531    1,024,002    4,595,532    
PV of Costs 99,699         311,944       -                   1,539,610    2,061,335    1,590,126    5,602,715    
Benefit - Costs 14,926         8,993           -                   141,827       (606,804)      (566,125)      (1,007,182)   
Retail
PV of Benefit 128,448       138,448       34,885         207,847       153,788       61,031         724,448       
PV of Costs 173,514       156,919       44,636         300,227       250,778       112,350       1,038,424    
Benefit - Costs (45,066)        (18,471)        (9,751)          (92,380)        (96,990)        (51,320)        (313,977)      
Hotel
PV of Benefit 73,679         130,816       -                   -                   -                   -                   204,495       
PV of Costs 160,450       108,429       -                   -                   -                   -                   268,879       
Benefit - Costs (86,771)        22,388         -                   -                   -                   -                   (64,384)        
Golf Course
PV of Benefit -                   -                   174,854       -                   -                   -                   174,854       
PV of Costs -                   -                   188,170       -                   -                   -                   188,170       
Benefit - Costs -                   -                   (13,317)        -                   -                   -                   (13,317)        
Hospital
PV of Benefit -                   328,716       -                   -                   -                   -                   328,716       
PV of Costs -                   341,707       -                   -                   -                   -                   341,707       
Benefit - Costs -                   (12,992)        -                   -                   -                   -                   (12,992)        
School
PV of Benefit -                   38,771         -                   32,203         -                   -                   70,974         
PV of Costs -                   37,788         -                   36,018         -                   -                   73,806         
Benefit - Costs -                   983              -                   (3,815)          -                   -                   (2,832)          
Park, PV of Costs -                   39,760         27,964         35,560         6,745           49,173         159,202       
Land, PV of Costs 256,550       149,975      214,380     468,408     68,361       237,750      1,395,424    
TOTAL Benefits - Costs (86,333)        465,283      (133,693)    (277,743)    (769,221)    (906,142)     (1,707,848)   
Figure 6.9: Input Assumptions for DCF Analysis 
 
Assumptions Yield Growth Spec Disc. Rate
Residential 3.5% 7.3% 2.0% 12.8%
Office 9.0% 3.6% 3.0% 15.6%
Retail 12.0% 5.1% 2.0% 19.1%
Hotel 8.0% 3.6% 3.0% 14.6%
Golf 5.0% 6.4% 1.0% 12.4%
Risk-Free Rate 5.5%
Assumptions Housing Office Retail Hotel Hospital School Gov. Golf Park
DEVELOPMENT COST 173         185         150       190       216       150       170       22           15          
SALES REVENUE 285         -             -            -            238       165       187       16           -             
ANNUAL NET INCOME -              30           32         27         -            -            -             1             -             
* Figures here are US$ per SF in 2003 dollars.
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The result in figure 6.10 shows that the only property type that generates positive NPVs is 
residential property. This is somewhat expected since it was the only component with the verified 
high demand and the sales price level. Also, only the second phase has a positive NPV of $465 
million, because it is the period of a extensive housing build up. Later phases have increasingly 
higher level of negative NPVs. The fact that the cash flows are coming from the later in the future 
and most office spaces are planned for later stages is two most important reasons for this 
accelerating level of negative NPVs. On the aggregate level, the NSC project has an IRR of 
28.8% and yet it generates US$ 1.4 billion of negative NPV. The IRR alone seems quite 
attractive. However, the project involves much greater degree of risks based on the NPV rule and 
should be rejected if the developer must follow the planned course of the development (i.e. there 
is no flexibility of later stage decision makings). 
6.2. Valuation of New Songdo City as Compound Expansion Option 
As illustrated in the chapter 4, the projects, especially with multiple stages with high level of 
risks, have a potential to generate value far exceeding the one suggested by the conventional NPV 
approach. The one of the major source of uncertainties comes from the uncertainties of the 
market. Real Options approach is an appropriate tool, when valuing the flexibility related to the 
overall market risks. In this section, Real Options model is used to value options of waiting for 
the better market condition and abandoning the project when unfavorable market continues. 
6.2.1. Structure of Options: Sequential Compound Option 
The current agreement between the government and the Gale Company is inherently option-like, 
and it should be considered as such. The purchase of the land for the first phase and the 
commitment of building a new convention center and turning it over to the government can be 
considered as the purchase of an option to develop NSC in a sequential manner. The government 
granted an exclusive right to develop to the Gale Company in exchange for the convention center 
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and the commitment to follow the mutually developed and agreed physical master plan.33 As 
described previously, the government also gave the Gale Company right to purchase remaining 
parcels for the later phase for a predetermined price, which is assumed to be lower than their fair 
market value. Following this structure, the total amount of US$ 256,550,00034 is the price paid for 
the purchase of the development option. Also, multiple phasing can be considered as a sequential 
compound option. The later phase projects can only be started once the previous phases are fully 
committed and started construction. The each phase has its own strike price equal to the 
development costs of the corresponding phase. The underlying asset is the collection of all the 
properties to be developed in NSC, and in each phase, some portion of them is assumed to be 
constructed based on the predetermined master plan. 
 
6.2.2. Volatility of Underlying Assets 
The most critical input assumption required for the options valuation is the volatility of the 
underlying asset. However, due to the scarcity and the unreliability of data, it is challenging to 
make a reliable estimate of the asset volatility. Several data sources are considered for this reason. 
 
First, it is possible to estimate the volatility by finding out a “twin security” in the capital market, 
as suggested by Arman and Kulatilaka (1999). Construction companies in Korea are in essence 
merchant builders and developers, and their business is very similar to the large development 
project like NSC. Accordingly, it is possible to find the return data of such pubic companies and 
use their volatilities as guidance for the volatility of the assets to be built in NSC. A portfolio of 
the five largest construction companies is selected for the analysis with equal weighting. The 
monthly return data during the past decade is used for the analysis and figure 6.11 shows the 
                                                          
33 See graphics and maps in Appendix D and E for details of the New Songdo City master plan. 
34 This amount includes the purchase price of the first phase land, costs related to predevelopment 
(feasibility study, costs related to setting up a project company, early stage overhead costs, etc.) and the 
development costs of the new convention center. 
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volatility of the monthly return of this portfolio. It turns out that the construction sector has been 
the most volatile sector in the Korean stock market, which in itself has exhibited excessive 
historical volatility. The portfolio of the construction companies has 63% annual standard 
deviation of its returns compared to 37% of KOSPI stock market index. The high volatility of the 
construction sector might be originated from the high leverage used by the construction 
companies, and also it is highly correlated with the overall stock market volatility. It is unlikely 
that the properties themselves exhibit such a high level of volatility, and thus it might not be 
appropriate to consider stocks of construction companies as “twin securities.” 
 
Second method to estimate the volatility of the underlying asset is to rely on the data from the 
direct asset market. The housing market in Korea has been notorious for its volatility due the high 
level of speculation. Prof. Lee of Korea University describes the Korean housing market as one 
similar to a gambling table (2002): 
The economy, already suffering from unemployment and fluctuating prices, is 
now being plagued by rampant real estate speculation. This real estate 
speculation boom is an archfiend wielding terrible power, capable of blowing out 
the flickering signs of a hopeful economic recovery. In the Kangnam area, south 
Figure 6.11: Monthly Return Volatility of Construction Companies and Residential 
Sales Prices (1993-2003) 
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of the Han River, outright acts of apartment purchase right speculation bear an 
uncanny resemblance to speculation in action at a bustling, lively gambling 
table. Dealers and owners are colluding to buy up purchase rights of newly built 
apartments in order to boost apartment prices after which they will walk away 
with enormous profits from trading. 
 
Such anecdotal evidences suggest a stock market like volatility for the for-sale housing market. 
The reliable source for accurately estimating the property level volatility would be challenging 
due to the limited published data. Unlike the US and some other countries, Korea does not yet 
have real estate historical return index that can be used for the estimation for all property types. 
The housing market, however, fairly extensive documented sales and income data, and they can 
be a reasonable source for the estimation. The Housing and Commerce Bank of Korea, now 
merged to Kookmin Bank, has complied a housing sales price index since 1986, and it is 
considered the most reliable data available for the Korean real estate market. However, the index 
is compiled based on the survey of local brokers, and it is customary that brokers and sellers 
underreport the actual transaction prices most of the times. Therefore, the volatility estimated is 
likely to be somewhat understated. Based on this index, the annual return volatility of the housing 
market during the past year is 19.1%. 
 
For other commercial markets, the only available source is from the broker’s research reports. For 
example, the historical asset price level showed in figure 6.5 is from the brokerage firm BHP 
Korea, and it is based on the survey of 96 office properties in the business districts of Seoul. As a 
result, its data source is too limited to represent overall market, but it still provides a useful 
guidance. This data has a low annual return volatility of 7.9%, which is much lower than that of 
the housing market. Anecdotal evidences suggest that the low volatility in the office market 
compared to that of the housing market, and yet the degree of their disparity can be misleading 
considering their difference in the data source. For the other property types such as hotels and 
retails, there are virtually no historical return data available. However, the combined value of all 
the other assets account for less than 10% of the entire project valuation. Therefore, their 
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influence on the overall volatility of the portfolio would not be substantial. For this reason, the 
volatilities of retail, hotel and other properties are assumed to be consistent with the overall 
property portfolio. 
 
Even if the volatilities of 19.1% and 7.9%, for the housing and the office market respectively, are 
fairly accurate on the index level, individual properties would have higher degree of volatility due 
to the individual idiosyncratic risks involved. For example, the unsmoothed NCRIEF index in the 
US has only 6% volatility during the past decade, and yet the typical properties in the US have 
shown volatility in the range between 15% and 20% (Geltner and Miller, 2001). Initially, the 
volatility of the entire project as a portfolio is calculated based on the residential and the office 
market data. The portfolio weights of each property type are determined based on the present 
values from the DCF analysis. The present values of the residential and the office components are 
$7,463,495,000 and $4,595,332,000 respectively. Consequently, the residential and the office 
component have portfolio weights of 61.9% and 38.1% respectively. The correlation between two 
return data is 35.1%. With these variables, the portfolio volatility is calculated: 
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The resulting volatility of 13.2% could be used for lower bound estimate. As is in the case of the 
US, the project level volatility should be higher than the index level. In addition, the properties in 
the entirely new city are likely to be more volatile in the beginning than the properties in mature 
cities. Considering all the risks factors analyzed in this chapter, the base volatility of 25%, which 
is slightly higher than the range in the US market, will be used. To be sure, this estimate is, to 
large extent, a subjective estimate and thus it warrants sensitivity analysis around this value. 
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6.2.3. Sequential Compound Option Valuation using Binomial Lattice 
Figure 6.12 illustrates the procedure used for the valuation of the sequential compound option 
structured in the previous chapter.35 The current plan is that each stage of the project start a year 
apart and there is a tremendous political pressure to proceed as soon as possible. However, there 
is no contractual obligation to follow the plan precisely. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
the Gale Company would have an option to wait at least two years before starting the next phase. 
The sequential compound option model used in figure 6.12 uses this assumption of 2 years of 
waiting time for each phase. Also, there is an abandonment option to stop the project any time 
during the process. For the modeling purpose, constant volatility (σ) and income payout rate (y) 
are assumed. This is obliviously a simplification because asset volatilities can change over time, 
and income level of real estate changes as evidenced by frequent cap rate changes in real estate 
markets. As a payout rate, 6% weighted average of cap rates for all the properties in the project is 
used. In realty, payout rate should be adjusted for each phase because each phase has different 
composition of property types. The variability of payout rate and volatility can be incorporated 
with more sophisticated programming. However, the above assumptions are made to simplify the 
modeling process. 
 
The binomial tree method is used due to its simplicity and flexibility. As a first step, the asset 
price movement is modeled with one year time step. The risk neutral probability (q) and the 
upward movement (u) of asset price in each time step are calculated based on the constant 
volatility and dividend payout rate. With the base assumption of 25% volatility and 6% payout 
rate, the following values are derived:  
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35 See Appendix C for detailed binomial model for the analysis. 
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Figure 6.12: Valuing NSC as 6 Stage Sequential Compound Option 
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12,260,660 12,260,660 12,260,660 12,260,660 12,260,660
11,539,350 X 11,539,350 X 11,539,350 X 11,539,350 X 11,539,350 X 11,539,350
8,408,562 8,408,562 8,408,562 8,408,562 8,408,562 8,408,562
X 8,539,333 X 8,539,333 X 8,539,333 X 8,539,333 X 8,539,333 X
5,408,545 5,408,545 5,408,545 5,408,545 5,408,545
X 6,202,917 X 6,202,917 X 6,202,917 X 6,202,917 X 6,202,917
3,117,046 3,079,928 3,072,129 3,072,129 3,072,129
. 4,383,314 . 4,383,314 X 4,383,314 X 4,383,314 X
1,708,032 1,639,425 1,520,393 1,252,527
. 2,966,207 . 2,966,207 . 2,966,207 X 2,966,207
848,832 727,867 507,852 0
. 1,862,562 . 1,862,562 . 1,862,562 .
340,293 205,915 0
. 1,049,161 . 1,023,498 . 1,003,043
83,491 0 0
. 543,346 . 495,911 .
0 0
. 237,246 . 164,900
0 0
. 66,861 .
0
. 0
0
.
Node Time (Year): 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
95,060,218
90,507,489
72,892,923 X
68,340,194
55,629,015 X 55,629,015
51,076,286 51,076,286
PHASE IV 42,183,871 X 42,183,871 X
S4 = 4,274,987    37,631,142 37,631,142
X4 = 4,552,729    468,408 31,712,782 X 31,712,782 X 31,712,782
T = 8                  27,160,053 27,160,053 27,160,053
23,557,889 X 23,557,889 X 23,557,889 X
19,005,160 19,005,160 19,005,160
17,206,853 X 17,206,853 X 17,206,853 X 17,206,853
12,654,124 12,654,124 12,654,124 12,654,124
12,260,660 X 12,260,660 X 12,260,660 X 12,260,660 X
7,707,931 7,707,931 7,707,931 7,707,931
8,408,562 X 8,408,562 X 8,408,562 X 8,408,562 X 8,408,562
4,401,584 4,315,143 4,181,942 3,971,109 3,855,833
. 5,408,545 . 5,408,545 . 5,408,545 . 5,408,545 X
2,359,065 2,199,290 1,953,089 1,563,395
. 3,117,046 . 3,079,928 . 3,072,129 . 3,072,129
1,126,452 930,959 633,898 0
. 1,708,032 . 1,639,425 . 1,520,393 .
433,850 257,022 0
. 848,832 . 727,867 . 507,852
104,213 0 0
. 340,293 . 205,915 .
0 0
. 83,491 . 0
0 0
. 0 .
0
. 0
0
.
Node Time (Year): 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011
51,076,286
49,767,768
PHASE III 37,631,142 X
S3 = 1,174,826    36,322,623
X3 = 1,308,519    214,380 27,160,053 X 27,160,053
T = 6                  25,851,534 25,851,534
19,005,160 X 19,005,160 X
17,696,642 17,696,642
12,654,124 X 12,654,124 X 12,654,124
11,345,605 11,345,605 11,345,605
7,707,931 X 7,707,931 X 7,707,931 X
6,450,602 6,399,413 6,399,413
4,401,584 . 4,315,143 X 4,181,942 X 3,971,109
3,574,917 3,420,163 3,178,799 2,662,590
. 2,359,065 . 2,199,290 . 1,953,089 X
1,773,383 1,525,705 1,079,580
. 1,126,452 . 930,959 . 633,898
714,638 437,729 0
. 433,850 . 257,022 .
177,483 0
. 104,213 . 0
0 0
. 0 .
0
. 0
0
.
Node Time (Year): 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
PHASE II PHASE I
S2 = 3,260,798    S1 = 1,373,314    
X2 = 2,795,515    149,975 25,851,534 X1 = 1,203,098    
T = 4                  23,056,019 T = 2                  
17,696,642 X
14,901,126
11,345,605 X 11,345,605 8,550,090
8,550,090 8,550,090 7,346,992
6,450,602 X 6,399,413 X 4,318,197 X
4,318,197 3,674,105 3,179,483
3,574,917 . 3,420,163 . 3,178,799 2,114,544 . 1,573,790
2,114,544 1,573,790 383,284 1,370,478 370,693
. 1,773,383 . 1,525,705 X . 672,204 X
672,204 155,407 150,302
. 714,638 . 437,729 . 63,012
63,012 0 0
. 177,483 . .
0
. 0
0
.
Node Time (Year): Node Time (Year): 
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2003 2004 2005
$1,370,478,000
1,370,477,568
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Once the asset price movement is modeled based on the calculated input values, the option value 
is solved backwards starting from the sixth phase. Assuming two years of potential waiting period 
in each phase, the sixth phase has 12 years to maturity and later phase would have 2 years shorter 
maturity in each step. Since these options can be exercised anytime before or at the maturity, each 
option should be valued as an American Option. 
 
With the base case of 25% volatility, the price of the option is US$1,370,478,000 based on the 
binominal model. Since US$ 256,550,000 was committed to purchase this option, net value 
created with the project is US$ 1,113,928,000. Compared to the negative NPV of 
US$1,707,848,000, the flexibility of waiting and abandonment generates US$ 2,821,776,000 of 
additional value. This result provides a completely opposite view towards the project and 
demonstrates the enormous potential value of flexibility for long-term large scale projects.    
 
However, the resulting value should only be an approximation as a result of numerous 
simplifications made. Therefore, it warrants a sensitivity analysis to observe a range of potential 
values from the model. Figure 6.13 is the result of the sensitivity analysis, and figure 6.14 
graphically shows the result of option value sensitivity in relation to volatility and initial asset 
prices. The result shows that there is little option value with the volatility level below 10% and 
the volatility of 15% and above is needed for the investor to reasonably accept the value of option 
beyond the purchase price of the option. 
 
Figure 6.13: Sensitivity of Option Value on Volatility (σ) and Asset Value (S) 
           
Volatility 100% Asset Value 90% Asset Value 80% Asset Value 70% Asset Value
0% 0 0 0 0
5% 0 0 0 0
10% 282,981,524 32,661,971 0 0
15% 588,862,922 293,560,160 60,291,639 0
20% 898,292,532 561,903,823 308,635,969 61,187,101
25% 1,370,477,568 840,232,791 559,779,171 290,014,520
30% 1,872,472,289 1,179,824,998 810,723,735 520,374,890
35% 2,365,944,011 1,615,390,127 1,060,030,749 751,471,874
40% 2,849,396,617 2,080,888,058 1,411,973,126 980,058,284
45% 3,323,823,271 2,535,492,061 1,762,571,879 1,230,389,633
50% 3,789,469,438 2,977,938,654 2,166,407,869 1,549,655,458  
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6.3. Application of Decision Tree Analysis to Project Specific Risks 
The Real Options analysis in the previous section reveals a huge value in the flexibility of the 
project. However, it is important to note that the real option analysis performed in the previous 
section only deals with the uncertainty in random changes of asset prices. Real Options model is 
only useful as regard to broad market based uncertainties, and yet there are many other risks 
specific to the project as identified in the chapter 5. Decision Tree Analysis is a more suitable tool 
for project specific risks and it can provide a useful framework for further analysis. In this 
section, Decision Tree is applied to account for a series of project specific risks. Decision Tree 
Analysis can be used in conjunction with the Real Options model. That is, Decision Tree would 
Figure 6.14: Option Value Sensitivity Graph 
          (*The shaded area on the graph indicates the most likely range of volatility (15~35%) 
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first layout uncertainties and corresponding flexibilities. Then the effect of the project specific 
uncertainties can be interpreted as a change in the input variables of the Real Options model. This 
approach would complement the shortcomings of DTA as a quantitative analysis tool. 
 
The first project specific risk to be considered is the uncertainties of the initial asset prices. The 
Real Options model only accounts for volatility of asset prices and the current value of the asset 
is only a fixed input variable. The rent and sales price level was determined through the market 
research, and the future expected cash flow based on the research was discounted to determine the 
current value of assets. One of the unique characteristic of the NSC project is that it does not 
belong to any specific market because it is creating a brand new city from a scratch. Therefore, in 
what level the properties are going to be valued by investors are unknown, and this risk is project 
specific even though it is related to the market. Three possible scenarios of high, expected and 
low initial asset price levels are used to describe this uncertainty.  
 
The other risks are also treated in a similar manner. Government’s failure of providing promised 
infrastructure such as bridges and a mass transit system is another important risk. The initial 
pitfalls of the Canary Wharf project in London were primarily due to the delay in construction of 
the transportation infrastructure (Poorvu and Segal, 2004). The government’s strong support for 
the project makes this event rather unlikely. However, there is a small possibility, given the 
massive investment required. The first stage project can still be supported with the existing 
infrastructure and any delay would affect the second stage and later ones. This risk again can be 
valued by downward adjusting asset and rent price levels. 
 
The third project specific risk to be considered is coming from the possibility of government’s 
abandoning its support when a new president is elected in the year 2006. The success of the 
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Figure 6.15: Structure of Decision Tree for Analysis of Project Specific Risks 
         (* Heavy line indicates the base scenario) 
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project is not achievable without the promised government supports and any potential change in 
the government’s policy toward the Free Economic Zone would greatly affect the outcome of the 
project. Therefore, from the third phase, this risk is factored in by adjusting asset prices 
downward in the case of political conflicts. The last project specific risks is related the degree of 
success for the Free Economic Zone initiative, the later phase office spaces are dependent on its 
success. When it fails to attract global companies as it promised, it is unlikely that over 30 million 
square feet of office space can be filled. Also, if FEZ turns out to be a huge success, the property 
values would be much higher than the base value calculated under conservative assumptions. 
Figure 6.15 lays out the four risks considered in a sequential manner within the Decision Tree 
framework. 
 
Using the Real Options model to calculated payoffs of each decision and chance path is much 
simpler than valuing within the Decision Tree. Also, it effectively avoids challenges of 
determining correct discount rates. As a base setting, upward or downward change of 20% in 
asset price with 17% probability of each extreme outcome is assumed for the analysis. 
Probabilities of negative effects from the delay in infrastructure and political conflicts are 
assumed to have 5% and a 30% drop in asset prices is assumed for these negative events. Based 
on these base assumptions, the resulting value of the option is US $1,804 million and it is US 
$434 million higher than the value of US$ 1,370 million obtained by only using the previous 
compound option model. This is due to the flexibility that allows cutting down the lower bound 
returns and at the same time capturing the asset price jumps in the case of the better than expected 
outcomes. Figure 6.16 illustrates the procedure to calculate the expected value of the decision and 
the risk structure laid out in figure 16.15. Given the entirely subjective nature of input 
assumptions, this value itself is not so meaningful. However, this exercise allows developers to 
see complex interaction of both project specific and market based uncertainties. By performing 
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sensitivity analyses on the assumptions, developers can better understand the effect of individual 
risks on the overall project feasibility.  
 
Figure 6.16: Expected Value Calculation for Decision Tree 
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Ch. 7. Conclusion 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The issue of flexibility brought up in the thesis is a critical matter to real estate developers. Due to 
the absence of intuitive analytical method of valuing flexibilities, developers have relied on 
rudimentary tools such as cash-on-cash returns and sensitivity analyses. Even worse, developers 
often times have no choice other than entirely depending on their intuition for their critical 
investment decisions. Two tools introduced in the thesis, Decision Tree and Real Options can 
address the problem of valuing flexibilities. 
 
The case study of the New Songdo City reveals that maximizing the value of flexibility is a key 
for a success in large-scale real estate development projects. It proves that Real Options and 
Decision Tree provide an effective analytical toolset for valuing such projects. However, the 
quantitative result of the analysis is not reliable enough to be used as precise value estimation due 
to the subjective and the incomplete assumptions made for the analyses. It is essential to 
understand this shortcoming to make an appropriate use of the analysis, and yet it should not stop 
developers applying these methods. The conventional DCF procedure would significantly 
undervalue long-term large-scale projects and relying on cash-on-cash return or intuition instead 
does not provide any analytical framework. In this regard, the further development of the 
presented method is crucial for the development industry. 
 
Based on the approach used for the analysis of the New Songdo City project, the following 
procedure for valuing large-scale development projects is recommended: 
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1. Identify all the risks related to the development project, and determine the major source 
of identified risks. 
2. Perform a DCF valuation incorporating the expected future cash flows and the risks 
identified, as if there is no flexibility in the project. A rigorous DCF analysis is critical 
because it is used as a basis of the later analysis. 
3. Research market data for quantifiable risks, such as the volatility of underlying asset 
returns. If there is no reliable data available, a best subjective judgment has to be made. 
4. Determine the structure of the option as to the identified risks. It is critical to know which 
options are valuable since real world projects would involve numerous options.  
5. Once market based risks are identified and necessary input data are assumed, a Real 
Options model can be used to value the project’s flexibility. The binomial tree approach 
is recommended because it is the most intuitive options valuation model and is easily 
customizable. 
6. For project specific risks, the Decision Tree Analysis can be used. In most cases, there 
would be few data available for this type of risks. Hence, a degree of subjective judgment 
has to be used. The Decision Tree can help developers to understand interrelationship 
between different kind of flexibilities and uncertainties. When appropriate, DTA can be 
used in conjunction with Real Options. For instance, the payoffs in a Decision Tree can 
be calculated with the Real Options model by varying input variables. 
7. Through sensitivity analysis must be performed. The single value estimate from the 
proposed model is not reliable enough to make base critical decisions. Sensitivity 
analyses would provide developers a range of values, and more importantly it would 
clearly show the relationship between input variables and the value of resulting 
flexibility. 
8.  Once the relation between the input assumptions and the value of flexibilities becomes 
clearer, developers should look for the opportunities to maximize the value by influence 
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the options structure with contract, negotiation with other parties, etc. This opportunity is 
unique to the real world options as opposed to financial options36 and every effort must 
be made to take advantage of this opportunity. 
It is obvious that the procedure recommended has a lot of room for further development 
especially in the area of modeling techniques. However, the advantage of this procedure is that it 
can be practically implemented with basic knowledge of options valuation, and it provides a 
analytical perspective of flexibility in development projects. For straightforward short-term 
development projects, this process itself might be too time-consuming and a simple method such 
as Samuelson-McKean model can be used instead. Large-scale projects with long-term multiple 
stages, however, should require a thorough analysis of flexibility similar to the recommended 
method. The potential value of flexibility is simply too large to be ignored. Successful developers 
must have intuitively learned to value and enhance flexibilities in their projects. This tool could 
provide a resource for developers to distinguish themselves from the average developer that only 
have a limited tool set available for them, and as a result, it could help increasing number of more 
exciting yet complicated projects becoming a reality.  
 
                                                          
36 Financial options can be valued fairly accurately because most input variables are determined by the 
market. For this same reason, it is impossible for investor to alter underlying conditions. In the case of Real 
Options, investors often find opportunities to alter input variables in a options valuation model. The chapter 
4.4.2 explains this possibility in detail. 
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Appendix A: New Songdo City Project Inventories 
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Appendix B: Pro-forma Discount Cash Flow Analysis 
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Appendix C: Valuation of Compound Expansion Options 
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Appendix D: New Songdo City Master Plan 
 
 
 
a. OVERALL MASTER PLAN 
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b. PHASING AND BLOCK DIAGRAM 
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c. BUILDING TYPES AND PROGRAMS 
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d. PROPOSED DISTRICT ZONING DIAGRAM 
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e. PROPOSED BUILDING FAR DIAGRAM 
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 Appendix E: New Songdo City Images 
 
 
 
a. AERIAL VIEW OF NEW SONGDO CITY 
 
 
 
 
b. CENTRAL PARK AND UNDERGROUND GARAGE 
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c. TYPICAL RESIDENTIAL BLOCK 
 
 
 
 
 
d. HIGH RISE MIXED-USE BLOCK NEAR WATER 
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e. DEPARTMENT STORE 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
f. STREET RETAIL AND CANAL 
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g. HOSPITAL 
 
 
 
 
h. GOLF COURSE AND CLUB HOUSE 
 
 - 147 - 
Bibliography 
 
 
 
 
American Chamber of Commerce Korea (2002). Korean Industry Overview and Recommend-
ations, Seoul, Korea. 
 
Arman, M. and N. Kulatilaka (1999). Real Options: Managing Strategic Investment in an 
Uncertain World, Harvard Business School Press, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Asia Risk (2004). Domestic Derivative Markets in Asia, <http://www.asiarisk.com.hk/managing 
/chapter3 _2.htm> 
 
Bank of Korea (2004). Economic Indicator, <http://www.bok.or.kr/content/old/attach/00000013 
/200404091 808080.pdf> 
 
Bodie, Z., A. Kane and A. J. Marcus (2002). Investments, 5th ed., McGraw-Hill, New York, NY. 
 
Brealey, R.A. and S.C. Myers (2003). Principles of Corporate Finance, 7th ed., McGraw-Hill, 
New York, NY. 
 
Bulan, L. T., C. J. Mayer and C. T. Somerville (2002) "Irreversible Investment, Real Options, and 
Competition: Evidence from Real Estate Development," AFA 2004 San Diego Meetings; UBC 
Commerce Centre for Urban Economics and Real Estate Working Paper No. 02-01. 
 
Business Wire (2002). “US-South Korea Joint Venture to Develop New Urban Center Next 
to World's Second Largest Airport in South Korea,” < http://www.businesswire.com/cgi-bin/cgi? 
pw.032502/bb9> 
 
Capozza, D. R. and R. W. Helsley (1990). “The Stochastic City,” Journal of Urban Economics, v. 
28, pp. 187-203 
 
Capozza, D. R. and G. A. Sick (1991). “Valuing Long-Term Leases: The Option to Redevelop,” 
Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, v. 4, pp. 209-223. 
 
CB Richard Ellis (2003). Seoul Office Market Report 
 
Childs, P. D., T. Riddiough and A. J. Triantis (1996). “Mixed Uses and the Redevelopment 
Option,” Real Estate Economics, no. 24, v. 3, pp. 317-339. 
 
Copeland, T. and V. Antikarov (2001). Real Options: A Practitioner’s Guide, Texere, New York, 
NY. 
 
Copeland, T. and P. Kennan (1998a). "How Much is Flexibility Worth?", The McKinsey 
Quarterly, no. 2, pp. 39-49. 
 
Copeland, T. and P. Kennan (1998b). "Making Real Options Real", The McKinsey Quarterly, no. 
3, pp. 129-141. 
 - 148 - 
 
Copeland, T. and J. Weiner (1990). "Proactive Management of Uncertainty", The McKinsey 
Quarterly, no. 4, pp. 133-153. 
 
Cox, J. C., S. A. Ross and M. Rubinstein (1979). “Option Pricing: A Simplified Approach,” 
September, Journal of Financial Economics, pp. 229-263. 
 
Cushman & Wakefield (2004). Seoul Office Snapshot 
 
Damodaran, A. (2002). Investment Valuation: Tools and Techniques for Determining the Value of 
Any Asset, 2nd ed., John Wiley, New York, NY. 
 
Decisioneering, Inc. (2000). Crystal Ball User Manual 
 
de Neufville, R. (1990). Applied Systems Analysis: Engineering Planning and Technology 
Management, McGraw-Hill Publishing Company, US. 
 
de Neufville, R. and J.E. III Neely (2001). "Hybrid Real Options Valuation of Risky Project 
Development Projects", International Journal of Technology, Management and Policy, 
Cambridge, MA. 
 
Dixit, A.V. and R.S. Pindyck (1994). Investment Under Uncertainty, Princeton University Press, 
Princeton, NJ. 
 
Geltner, D. (1989). “On the Use of the Financial Option Price Model to Value and Explain 
Vacant Urban Land,” AREUEA Journal, v. 17, n. 2, pp. 142-158 
 
Geltner, D. and N.G. Miller (2001). Commercial Real Estate Analysis and Investments, 1st ed., 
South-Western\College Publishing Co., Mason, OH. 
 
Geltner, D., T. Riddiough and S. Stojanovic (1996). “Insights on the Effect of Land Use Choice: 
The Perpetual Option on the Best of Two Underlying Assets,” Journal of Urban Economics, no. 
39, pp. 20-50. 
 
Giddy, I. H. (2000). “Deals illustrating evolution of the ABS market's role in Korea”, presented at 
Sogang University, Seoul, <http://giddy.org/absdealsinkorea.htm> 
 
Grenadier, S. R. (1995). “The Persistence of Real Estate Cycles,” Journal of Real Estate Finance 
and Economics, v. 10, pp. 95-119. 
 
Grenadier, S. R. (1996). “The Strategic Exercise of Options: Development Cascades and 
Overbuilding in Real Estate Markets,” Journal of Finance, v. 51, pp.1653-1679. 
 
Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority, “Concepts of FEZ,” IFEZA Web Site, <http://www. 
incheon.go.kr/business/economy/english/is/mind.jsp> 
 
Hammond III, J.S. (1975). “Introduction to Accumulated Value, Present Value and Internal Rate 
of Return”, Harvard Business School Case Study #9-173-003, Harvard Business School 
Publishing, Cambridge, MA. 
 
 - 149 - 
Holland, A. S., S. H. Ott and T. J. Riddiough. (1999). "The Role of Uncertainty in Investment: An 
Examination of Competing Investment Models Using Commercial Real Estate Data" 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=157328> 
 
Howell, S., et al (2001). Real Options: Evaluating Corporate Investment Opportunities in a 
Dynamic World, Prentice Hall, London, Great Britain. 
 
Hull, J. (2003). Options, Futures and Other Derivative Securities, 5th ed., Prentice Hall, 
Englewood Cliffs, NJ. 
 
Incheon Free Economic Zone Authority, “Songdo International Business District Overview,” 
IFEZA Web Site, <http://www.incheon.go.kr/business/economy/english/area/songdo_6.jsp> 
 
International Finance Corporation (1999). Project Finance in Development Countries,  pp.48-52 
 
Korea Ministry of Finance and Economy (2004). Korea Free Economic Zones Update, Seoul, 
Korea. 
 
Korea Ratings (2002). 2002 Construction Industry Overview 
 
Lander, D. M. and G. E. Pinches (1998). “Challenges to the Practical Implementation of 
Modeling and Valuing Real Options,” The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, v. 38, 
Special Issue, pp. 537-567. 
 
Lee, J. (2004). “Songdo Project Attracts First Funds,” Chosun Ilbo 
 
Lee, P. S. (2001). “Nightmarish Real Estate Speculation and Currency Crisis,”  Korea Times 
 
Leslie, K. J. and M. P. Michaels (1997). “The Real Power of Real Options,” The McKinsey 
Quarterly, n. 3, pp.5-22 
 
Li, Y. (1999). “Land Development in Emerging Markets,” International Real Estate Review, v.2, 
n.1, pp. 94-109. 
 
Margee, J. (1964). “How to Use Decision Tree in Capital Investment,” Harvard Business Review 
v.42, pp. 79-69. 
 
Meyers, S. C. (1977). “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing.” Journal of Financial Economics, 
v.5, pp. 146-175 
 
Money Plus (2004). “Songdo Residential Market Report,” <http://www.moneyplus.co.kr/mp-
pgm/news /newsListscr.php?service_cd=000005> 
 
Mun, J. (2002). Real Options Analysis: Tools and Techniques for Valuing Strategic Investments 
and Decisions, John Wiley & Sons, Hoboken, NJ. 
 
Muto, S. (2004). “U.S. Developer to Build a City in Korea,” The Wall Street Journal Online 
 
Myers, S. C. (1977). “Determinants of Corporate Borrowing,” Journal of Financial Economics, v. 
5, pp. 146-175. 
 
 - 150 - 
Oh, B. (2003). “Real Estate Market Undergoes Test,” Korean Now, Seoul, Korea. 
 
Oh, K. (2003). The Axis of Asia: Transforming Korea into Northeast Asia’s Business Hub, 
Korean Ministry of Finance and Economy Brochure, Seoul, Korea 
 
Piore, A. (2004). “Charm City?,” Newsweek International 
 
Poorvu, W. J. and A. I. Segal (2004). “Canary Wharf,” HBS Case No.9-803-058, Harvard 
Business School Publishing, Cambridge, MA 
 
Quigg, L. (1993). “Empirical Testing of Real Option-Pricing Models,” The Journal of Finance, v. 
48, n. 2, pp. 621-640 
 
Sorohan, M. (2004). “With Historic Partner Ship, New City Takes Shape,” Mortgage Bankers 
Association News Letter, v. 2, n. 23. 
 
New Songdo City, “Project Fact Sheet,” New Songdo City Web Site, <http://www.newsongdocity. 
com/main.aspx? Content= Content_NSCProjectOverview> 
 
Tinsely, R. (2000). Advanced Project Financing, Euromoney Books, London, Great Britain. 
 
Titman, S. (1985). “Urban Land Prices under Uncertainty,” American Economic Review, v.75, n.3, 
pp. 505-514 
 
TreeAge Software, Inc. (2004). TreeAge Pro User Manual 
 
Trigeorgis, L. (1993). “The Nature of Options Interactions and the Valuation of Investments with 
Multiple Options,” Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, n. 2, pp. 1 - 20. 
 
Vigers Korea Co., Ltd. (2002). Development Feasibility Study on New Songdo City 
 
Williams, J. T. (1991). “Real Estate Development as an Option,” Journal of Real Estate Finance 
and Economics, v. 27, pp. 191-208 
 
Williams, J. T. (1993). “Equilibrium and Options on Real Assets,” Review of Financial Studies, v. 
6, pp. 825-850 
 
Woori Bank (2004). “Press Release,” Woori Bank Web Site, <http://www.wooribank.com> 
 
Yahoo Finance Korea (2004). Company Report, <http://kr.biz.yahoo.com/p/0/0/005490.html> 
 
Yamaguchi, H., et al (2000). “The Real Option Premium in Japanese Land Prices,” Research 
Paper, International University of Japan. 
 
Yao, H. and F. Pretorius (2004) “Empirical Testing of Real Options in the Hong Kong 
Residential Real Estate Market,” Research Paper, University of Hong Kong. 
 
 
